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ABSTRACT
Prior research shows that income tax return 
preparers influence the income tax compliance decisions of 
their clients. Information about the risk that income tax 
return preparers perceive in reporting aggressively on 
their clients' income tax returns may help the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) reduce the tax gap that exists in 
the United States today. This study investigates the 
cognitive algebra that income tax return preparers use to 
combine the probability of the IRS's assessing penalties 
for misstatements on their clients' income tax returns 
with the consequences (penalties, etc.) of those decisions 
in forming risk perceptions for reporting aggressively on 
their clients' income tax returns in both single play 
decisions (those that affect only one client) and multi- 
play decisions (those that affect several clients). 
Information integration theory was used to determine the 
cognitive algebra that income tax return preparers use to 
form their risk perceptions.
The subjects were mostly CPAs who are either 
sole practitioners or partners in small CPA firms. The 
ANOVA results of a between subjects study reveal that 
income tax return preparers use an additive model to
ix
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combine the probability of an IRS examination and the 
consequences of the examination in arriving at their 
perceived risk for reporting aggressively on their 
clients' income tax returns regardless of the number of 
clients involved.
x
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Introduction
Tax researchers are interested in the 
motivations of United States citizens who pay income taxes 
at levels that most would consider economically irrational 
(Aim, McClelland and Schulze 1992). Most people do the 
"right" thing and pay income taxes legally owed. Yet, 
many others underpay their income taxes for many amoral 
reasons. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Compliance 
2000 program hopes to increase taxpayer compliance from 
its current 83% level to 90% by the year 2001 without 
increasing the number of tax returns examined. The IRS 
anticipates achieving this increased compliance by 
encouraging taxpayers to follow tax rules through 
manipulation of the 64 identified variables that influence 
taxpayers in determining the amount of income tax to pay 
(Internal Revenue Service 1978). Some of these 64 
variables are noneconomic, e.g., the compliance level of 
their peers, their religious beliefs, ethics, fairness of 
the law, complexity, age; others are economic factors such 
as financial need, and sanctions for evading taxes.
Besides the influence that these factors have upon
1
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taxpayers' reporting decisions, the amount of risk income 
tax return preparers associate with aggressively reporting 
items on clients' tax returns may affect the 
recommendations preparers make to their clients and, 
hence, taxpayers' reporting decisions. This study 
examines the formulation of that risk as it relates to 
income tax return preparers assuming an aggressive posture 
on an item that affects only one client's income tax 
return and assuming an identical posture on the same item 
on a group of their clients' income tax returns.
The research questions are developed in this 
chapter. First, the impact income tax return preparers 
have on their clients' compliance decisions will be 
discussed. Then the gambling nature of tax 
avoidance/evasion is addressed. Next, the purpose of the 
study is presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
statement of the research questions.
Preparers' Impact on Taxpayers' Compliance
Approximately 50% of all income tax returns are 
prepared by paid income tax return preparers (Internal 
Revenue Service 1994). With over 100 million income tax 
returns filed each year, paid income tax return preparers 
have millions of opportunities to exert significant 
influence over taxpayers' compliance decisions (Kaplan, 
Reckers, West and Boyd 1988). Generally, certified public 
accountants (CPAs) and attorneys are considered to be
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taxpayer advocates (Jackson and Milliron 1989) . In that 
role, Klepper, Mazur and Nagin (1991) refer to CPAs and 
attorneys specializing in income taxes as
enforcers/ambiguity-exploiters, implying that professional 
tax preparers1 encourage their clients to comply when the 
tax laws are unambiguous but exploit ambiguous areas by 
making decisions favorable to their clients in gray areas. 
Although the final responsibility for a tax return 
position rests with the taxpayer and not the preparer, 
most people who engage the services of a CPA or attorney 
follow the recommendations of the tax professional 
(Kaplan, Reckers, West and Boyd 1988). Thus the 
preparer's attitude toward risk may influence 
recommendations made to a client and, therefore, the 
client's tax compliance.
The Gambling Connection 
With the exception of the few who elect to evade 
taxes completely—not file income tax returns—everyone in 
the United States with income over a given amount 
voluntarily pays income taxes. The higher the income on
1The income tax return preparers of interest in 
this study are CPAs and attorneys.
2The IRS does not send people a statement for 
income taxes owed such as the statements property owners 
receive from taxing authorities for property taxes. People 
voluntarily determine the amount of income taxes to pay 
(Handelman 1989; Darrell 1961; ABA Commission on Taxpayer 
Compliance 1988) .
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a return or the higher the tax bracket a return is in, the 
greater the likelihood of it containing ambiguous tax 
issues and of being completed by a paid income tax return 
preparer (Long and Caudill 1987). The percentage of 
income tax returns prepared by paid professionals 
increases as the income and, presumably, the income taxes 
owed by the taxpayers increase. For example, 87% of the 
individual income tax returns with income over $200,000 
are signed by paid income tax return preparers (Internal 
Revenue Service 1994).
The CPAs and attorneys who prepare these returns 
recommend ways to minimize their clients' income taxes. 
These recommendations result in an immediate tax savings 
and reduces cash outflows for their clients. However, 
neither the paid preparers nor their clients are certain 
of the final outcome of their recommendations until the 
statute of limitations3 runs or the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) selects a return for examination and 
discovers any misstated items. This process is similar to 
a duplex gamble as shown in Figure 1. First, in a duplex 
gamble, one determines possible winnings (zero or the
The statute of limitations, the time period 
during which the IRS can assess additional taxes, expires 
three years from the due date of the tax return or three 
years from date of filing, whichever is later (Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) §6501(a).
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Possible Winnings Possible Losses
Win $X - Report Aggressively 
Win $0 - Report Nonaggressively
Lose $ Amount + P + I
Lose $0 - IRS Does Not Examine Return 
Lose $Winnings + Penalties + Interest - 
IRS Examines Return and Discovers 
Aggressively Reported ltem(s)
Figure 1. The Income Tax Gamble
amount taxes may be understated) . Aggressive positions 
must be taken on ambiguous issues for a taxpayer to win. 
Unless income tax return preparers assume some risk and 
exploit the gray areas in favor of their clients, winnings 
are impossible. Taxpayers can immediately realize 
"winnings" by reporting aggressively. Any losses are 
delayed until the IRS completes the duplex gamble by 
either selecting a specific return for examination or 
permitting the statute of limitations to run; in which 
case, the taxpayer has a zero loss.
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For purposes of this research, assume that 
adopting a conservative reporting posture and paying one's 
lawfully determined tax liability is a null event (i.e., 
it is neither a gain nor a loss). Then within the context 
of gambling, aggressive taxpayers may "win" if the IRS 
does not audit their returns, although the amount they 
"win" depends upon the risk they are willing to take in 
preparing their returns. If taxpayers engage paid income 
tax return preparers, the risk the income tax return 
preparers are willing to take in preparing their returns 
will determine the amount the taxpayers may "win." 
Aggressive income tax return preparers "win" by retaining 
their clients' goodwill and by obtaining referrals from 
existing clients. By taking greater risks, i.e., making 
more aggressive recommendations to minimize their clients' 
voluntarily reported taxable incomes, income tax return 
preparers and their clients "win" more than if the 
preparers make nonaggressive recommendations.
One way for the IRS to increase compliance 
through manipulation rather than examination is by 
decreasing the risk that income tax return preparers are 
willing to take on their clients' income tax returns. 
Congress, with the urging of the IRS, has passed numerous 
laws since the mid 1970's that impose penalties on income 
tax return preparers for assisting in tax schemes that 
result in tax avoidance or tax evasion. These sanctions
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have had limited effectiveness in preventing income tax 
return preparers from assuming aggressive tax postures on 
clients' income tax returns (Jackson and Milliron 1986) . 
Therefore, methods other than sanctions are needed to curb 
income tax return preparers' aggressive reporting on 
clients' income tax returns. The answers to the following 
questions may provide insight as to how the IRS may 
proceed in attempting to decrease the amount of risk 
income tax return preparers are willing to assume. Which 
factors and cognitive processes do income tax return 
preparers employ in deciding how much risk is acceptable? 
Are these factors and processes the same when determining 
an acceptable level of risk for one client as for a group 
of clients?
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to
determine if income tax return preparers' risk perceptions 
can help explain the observed level of "over-compliance," 
and (2) to examine factors that may affect income tax 
return preparers' formulation of risk perceptions. Prior 
research shows that people are apt to follow the tenets of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) expected utility 
theory to make decisions which are duplicated several 
times. However, individuals often violate the axioms of 
expected utility theory when confronted with unique, one­
time decisions (Diamond 1988; Ghosh and Crain 1993;
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Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lichtenstein 1965; Lopes 1981; 
Mowen and Mowen 1991; Prelec and Loewenstein 1991; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1988). This suggests that 
income tax return preparers may make decisions regarding 
issues concerning only one client differently from those 
applicable to several clients. If income tax return 
preparers viewed reporting decisions on several clients' 
tax returns as one in a series of decisions (multi-play 
tasks), and the reporting decision on a single return as a 
one-time decision (a single-play or isolated task), then 
the type of decision and the cognitive algebra income tax 
return preparers use may explain the recommendations made 
to their clients. This, in turn, may explain taxpayers' 
adherence to or rejection of expected utility theory 
axioms and, therefore, the payment of income taxes at 
economically irrational amounts.
Research Questions 
The first research question of this study is:
Do income tax return preparers use the same cognitive 
algebra to assess perceived risk when making decisions 
that affect only one client as when making decisions that 
affect several (10) clients? Information integration 
theory (Anderson 1981 and 1982) provides the basis for 
determining the cognitive model income tax return 
preparers use to assess their perceived risk of reporting 
aggressively on their clients' income tax returns. The
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effect, if any, that the probability of the IRS's 
assessing penalties and the related potential financial 
losses have upon income tax return preparers perceived 
risk of reporting aggressively on their clients' income 
tax returns will be addressed by the second research 
question: Do the probabilities of the IRS's assessing
penalties and the amount of those potential penalties 
influence income tax return preparers' perceived risk of 
assuming an aggressive posture on a tax issue?
The most important contribution this experiment 
will make is that income tax return preparers seeking to 
minimize their own potential losses may take conservative 
positions when making multi-play decisions but take more 
aggressive positions when making unique decisions.
Further, this study will explicitly investigate the 
cognitive algebra income tax return preparers use to make 
tax related decisions.




There are two categories of models associated 
with decision making under uncertainty-multiplicative 
expectancy models and nonmultiplicative heuristic models 
(Joag 1985). Since Bernoulli (1738) first proposed the 
idea that people have decreasing marginal utility for 
money, several expectancy theories/models have been 
proposed for decision making under uncertainty. The most 
frequently cited expectancy models are those of expected 
utility (EU) theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), 
subjective utility theory (Edwards 1955; Coombs, 
Bezembinder, and Goode 1967), subjective expected value 
(Preston and Baratta 1948), and prospect theory4 (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979).
However in real life, people consistently 
violate the axioms of expectancy theories when making
4Although prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky's
(1979) solution to the observed anomalies in expected
utility theory, differs from traditional expectancy theories
in several ways, it is analogous to the other expectancy
theories in that it requires the weighted probability of an
outcome be multiplied by its value to determine the expected 
value of a prospect.
10
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certain decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Yilmaz 1983; 
Prelec and Loewenstein 1991; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). 
In an attempt to explain these violations, several 
heuristic models for decision making under uncertainty 
have emerged. This chapter reviews the literature for 
both models but focuses on the literature for the 
heuristic models. Literature pertinent to expectancy 
models, heuristic models, the application of these models 
to both repeated decisions and unique decisions, and the 
formulation of risk perceptions are discussed in this 
chapter. The latter part of the chapter reviews three 
single factor heuristic models germane to tax preparers' 
decision making and risk perceptions in multi-play and 
single play decisions.
Expectancy Models 
Economics' "rational man" bases decisions on the 
expected outcomes of each alternative and selects the 
alternative with the highest expected value (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1944) . To calculated the expected value 
(utility or expectancy) of an outcome,5 multiply the value 
of each potential outcome by its probability and sum over 
all possible outcomes. The basic model is:
C In this paper, outcome is often used to denote a 
random variable. The expected value of a random variable is 
calculated by multiplying each possible value of the random 
variable by its probability of occurrence, and then summing 
over all possible values.
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E [V] = Ei(Pi*Vi), where Pi = probability of the ith 
outcome, Vi = dollar value of the ith outcome, and 
EiPi =1. To apply expectancy theory to decision making, 
one evaluates all possible alternatives in terms of the 
expected values of the outcomes. Expectancy theories 
posit that a rational person makes decisions to maximize 
utility (i.e., selects the outcome with the highest 
expected value).
Researchers observed that in certain situations 
real human beings did not act like the "rational man" when 
making decisions. These researchers proceeded to develop 
variations of von Neumann and Morgenstern's expected 
utility theory. In recent years, prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) has been the most popular of 
the expectancy theories for behavioral studies concerning 
taxpayers and tax preparers (Aim, McClelland and Schulze 
1992; Dusenbury 1994; Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood and 
Larkins 1992; Newberry, Reckers, and Wyndelts 1993;
Robben, Webley, Elffers and Hessing 1990; Sanders and 
Wyndetts 1989; Schadewald 1989; and Schepanski and Kelsey 
1990). Prospect theory is based on von Neumann and 
Morgentern's (1944) expected utility theory. It differs 
from expected utility theory in that the probability of 
each outcome is subjectively weighted and utility is 
measured as the change (gain or loss) from the current 
reference point rather than on one's final asset position.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 3
Tax related studies based on prospect theory have mixed 
results. Several studies will be discussed later in this 
chapter that support expectancy theories. Heuristic 
models that have been developed to explain the behavior of 
individuals that fail to follow the expectancy models will 
be discussed in the next section.
Heuristic Models 
Heuristic models of decision making under 
uncertainty often focus on a single aspect of an outcome. 
In other cases where outcomes manifest certain 
characteristics, a combination of aspects may be 
considered. Regret theory (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 
1982) , information integration theory (Anderson 1974a, 
1974b, 1974c, etc. summarized in Anderson 1981 and 1982), 
outcome variance (Bruner and Tajfel 1961; Popielarz 1967; 
Schiffman 1972), recency effects (Kogan and Wallach 1964; 
Lopes 1976), and multidimensional stimuli which depend 
upon the decision maker's personal preferences in regard 
to over- or under-weighting probabilities and outcomes 
(Slovic 1967; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968a, 1968b) are 
some nonmultiplicative models proposed as descriptive 
alternatives to expectancy models. Heuristic models do 
not assume that the decision makers combine probabilities 
and values multiplicatively but rather treat both 
probabilities and values as independent dimensions of the 
perceived risk of an outcome (Joag 1985).
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Multi-Plav Decisions
When one views a decision as one of a series, 
he/she is more likely to follow expectancy theories and 
choose the outcome with the highest expected value. The 
average actual payoff of a gamble converges to its 
expected value in the long run (Mood, Graybill, and Boes 
1974; Lapin 1987). People associate inconsequential risk 
with choosing the highest expected value because the weak 
law of large numbers applies in the long run. Therefore, 
choosing the alternative with the highest expected value 
in multi-play decisions approximates a riskless decision. 
Table 1 lists several studies that support the 
applicability of expectancy theories to multi-play 
conditions.
All of the studies listed in table 1 include 
test of expectancy theories except Combs and Bowen (1971). 
Combs and Bowen found that in addition to the expectation 
and variance of a gamble, risk was a function of a 
transformation on odds when subjects performed the task 
multiple times. The subjects were given both a numerical 
and a pictorial distribution of the outcomes of a gamble 
to be played once and for the same gamble to be played 24 
times. The subjects ranked the gambles according the 
riskiness of the gamble.
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T A B L E  1
















Coombs and Bowen 1971 Yes (a) (a) (a)
Joag, Mowen and Gentry 
1990
Yes Yes No (a)
Keren and Wagenaar 
1987
Yes Yes No Probability





Yes Yes No Probabilities and 
payoffs
Wedell and Bockenholt 
1990
Yes Yes No Higher probability 
of winning
(a) Not tested by referenced study.
In a purchasing experiment, Joag, Mowen and 
Gentry (1990) ask subjects to indicate the perceived risk 
associated with making the purchase of a single item that 
cost $X and with the purchase of 10 0 items that in total 
cost the exact number of dollars. The subjects perceived 
the risk associated with the single item to be far greater 
than that associated with the group of items.
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Sinqle-Plav Decisions
When individuals play a gamble or make the same 
decision many times, they rely upon the expected value of 
the outcomes to assess the risk associated with the 
gamble. In the short-run (single-play) , an uncertain 
outcome is seldom equal to its expected value.
Furthermore, when there are only two possible outcomes, a 
single outcome can never equal its expected value. 
Consequently, a decision maker may not rely upon expected 
value when making a unique decision. A single factor 
germane to an uncertain outcome may dominate the 
assessment of risk for a gamble played only a few times, 
e.g., in a nonmultiplicative model of decision making 
under uncertainty. Therefore, people who view a decision 
as a single, isolated incident may not follow expected 
utility theory because other factors may influence their 
risk perceptions and decisions (see table 1).
Risk Perception 
Risk and uncertainty are important factors in 
both normative (expectancy) and descriptive (heuristic) 
models of decision making. Therefore a discussion of 
these factors will assist in understanding decision 
making. Risk is the possibility of loss, disadvantage or 
damage; it is the subjective estimation of loss as 
measured by the decision maker (Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, s.v. "risk"). According to
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Kaplan and Garrick (1981) , risk differs from uncertainty: 
while uncertainty is always a part of risk, risk is not 
essential to uncertainty. Uncertainty is the absence of 
information or lack of knowledge about an event, an 
outcome, etc. (Rowe 1977) . For instance, assume that you 
expect to receive an inheritance; you may be uncertain of 
the amount that you will receive but you are not at risk. 
Whereas, uncertainty is applicable to both positive and 
negative outcomes, only bad (negative) outcomes count in 
assessing risk (Pope 1983). Thus, risk involves both 
uncertainty and damages (Kaplan and Garrick 1981).
Risk analysis involves a set of triplets: (1)
si( the scenario, (2) pit the probability of that 
scenario, and (3) xit the consequences or evaluation 
measure of that scenario (Kaplan and Garrick 1981) .
Kaplan and Garrick (1981, 13) suggest that to analyze risk 
using their model, one needs answers to three questions:
(i) What can happen? (i.e., What can go 
wrong?)
(ii) How likely is it that that will happen? 
(iii) If it does happen, what are the
consequences ?
These questions are pertinent during the decision-making 
process in which the decision maker forms risk perceptions 
prior to the decision. This study uses Kaplan and 
Garrick's (1981) symbolic equation for risk:
Risk = Uncertainty + Damages.
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The two basic components of risk—uncertainty 
(probability) and value of the outcome (damage or 
reward)—are the basis for both perceived risk and expected 
value. Generally, one considers expected value as the net 
long-term desirability or net positive side of an outcome, 
whereas, one considers perceived risk as the net long-term 
undesirability or negative side of an outcome (Joag 1985). 
The perfect decision is the one that maximizes expected 
value and minimizes risk. If alternative outcomes do not 
include one with both the highest expected value and the 
lowest risk, the decision maker may choose an alternative 
with the most desired feature. If the decision with lower 
expected value is acceptable, the risk associated with it 
must also be acceptable (Fischhoff, et al 1981). In 
addition, someone who wants to minimize perceived risk 
might utilize a nonmultiplicative model for decision 
making under uncertainty that focuses on a single aspect 
of the uncertain outcome to select an alternative.
Several nonmultiplicative models have been 
proposed to assist in assessing risk. One such model 
focuses on the probability of the occurrence of a specific 
outcome (Diamond 1988; Payne and Braunstein 1971).
Another model used when the consequences of an outcome or 
payoff are extremely high, ignores probabilities and 
focuses on the outcome(s) with the highest consequences 
(Diamond 1988; Payne and Braunstein 1971). When the
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probabilities and/or expected values are equal, people may 
focus on a third factor, the variance associated with a 
given outcome (Lopes 1981; Ghosh and Crain 1993). People 
may ignore all factors to the exclusion of their most 
recent experiences, and base all decisions solely on these 
experiences (Lichtenstein 1965).^ Finally, the public may 
make decisions solely on the basis of minimizing their 
future disappointment or regret (Bell 1982; Loomes and 
Sugden 1982, 1987). In each of these scenarios, the 
dominant factors may bias risk perceptions and lead to the 
selection of an alternative appertaining to the most 
influential factor. The two factors this study 
investigates—probability and consequence—both affect risk 
perceptions and, thus, influence decision making under 
uncertainty. They are discussed in the following 
subsections.
Dominant Factor—Possibility of Coming Out Ahead
Lopes (1981) argues that in the short-run 
(single-play), choosing the outcome with the greatest 
possibility of coming out ahead, rather than the outcome 
with the highest expected value, is the rational decision. 
Using the difference between the sampling distributions of
Kogan and Wallach (1964) observed the influence 
of recent experiences on gamblers' decision making. They 
found that the final bet of the day is more conservative for 
both men and women the larger their winnings for the day. 
Also, adaptation theory (Kahneman and Varey 1989) is closely 
related to recency effects.
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Gamble 1 has greater possibility of coming out ahead in this region.
Gamble 1
G am ble 2
$3,451 $4,005
$3,725
Gamble I: .75 to win $5; .25 to lose $.10; EV = $3,725; a = $137.94 
Gamble II: 0.005 to win $1,000; 0.995 to lose $1; EV $4,005; o  = $2,232.70.
Probability Distribution Area for 1.000 Trials of each Gamble
Less than or equal to:
Gamble 1 
Gamble 2
$3,451 = -2 a G1 
2.3%
40.2%
$3,725 = ^G 1 
50.0% 
45.1%
$4,005 = n G 
98.0% 
50.0%
Figure 2. Comparison of Gamble With Greater 
Possibility of Coming Out Ahead and Gamble With 
Higher Expected Value
the sum of total winnings for 1,000 trials of two gambles, 
Lopes (1981) shows that the total winnings for the gamble 
with the lower expected value exceed the total winnings 
for the gamble with the higher expected value 57% of the 
time. These are the results of Lopes' Gamble 1 (0.75 to 
win $5; 0.25 to lose $.10) which has an expected value of 
$3,725 and Gamble 2 (0.005 to win $1,000; 0.995 to lose 
$1) which has an expected value of $4,005. Figure 1 
illustrates Lopes' gambles in which the greatest
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possibility of coming out ahead is the gamble with the 
lower expected value. For symmetric wagers, the 
cumulative gain for a wager with a lower expected value 
and smaller variance may be larger than the corresponding 
cumulative gain for a wager with a higher expected value 
but a greater variance for a large proportion of outcomes. 
Lopes (1981, 380) advises people "in evaluating gambles,
. . . do not consider the large amounts that we are
prodigiously unlikely to get, but, rather, consider the 
amounts we are likely to get most of the time." Lopes 
concludes that the rational decision for a short-run, 
unique gamble is the one with the greatest possibility of 
coming out ahead.
Keren and Wagenaar (1987) conducted two 
experiments where the subjects chose between two gambles. 
In one experiment, the subjects play the gamble once; in 
the other experiment, they play it 10 times. Most of the 
subjects in the play one-time experiment choose a 99% 
chance to win $100 and a 1% chance to lose $2 (Gamble 1, 
expected value $98.98) over a 50% chance to win $250 and a 
50% chance to lose $2 (Gamble 2, expected value $124.00), 
ignoring the fact that the expected value of the latter 
gamble is more than the former (Keren and Wagenaar 1987). 
Most subjects in the repeated play experiment selected the 
gamble with the higher expected value. When they had only 
one chance to win or lose, subjects preferred the gamble
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with the greatest possibility of coming out ahead, which 
according to expected utility theory is less rational than 
the one with the highest expected value (Coombs and Bowen 
1971; Joag, Mowen, and Gentry 1990).
A large body of literature has developed to 
explain preference reversals (1) when a gain is restated 
as a loss and (2) between pricing and choice behavior 
(Lopes 1981; Keren and Wagenaar 1987; Lichtenstein,
Slovic, and Zink 1969; Montgomery and Adelbratt 1982; 
Wedell and Bockenholt 1990; Mullet 1992; Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1968b; Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . In Wedell 
and Bockenholt's (1990) experiment, subjects were asked to 
choose which bet out of a pair they would prefer to play 
and to indicate a minimum selling price for each bet in 
the pair. The lotteries were played 1, 10, and 100 times. 
When subjects could play a gamble only one time, they 
chose the gamble with a higher probability of winning a 
modest amount over the gamble with a low probability of 
winning a large amount. Contrary to logic, when asked to 
set a minimum selling price for each gamble, they priced 
the gamble with the higher probability of winning a modest 
amount lower than the other gamble. Moreover, as the 
number of times that subjects play a gamble increases, 
preference for the bet with the highest probability of 
winning a modest amount decreases for choice but increases 
for pricing tasks, whereas the opposite change occurs for
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bets with a low probability of winning a large amount. To 
summarize the findings of Wedell and Bockenholt (1990), 
subjects prefer the gamble with (1) the smaller 
probability of losing when the probability of winning (Pw) 
is less than the probability of losing (Pi), i.e., Pw < Px,
(2) the greater valued outcome ($w) when Pw > PL, and (3) 
the greater Pw when Pw > PL and the amounts to be won are 
equal. When people are not prejudiced by the probability 
of an outcome, as these studies suggest, the consequences 
of the outcome may be the prevailing influence.
Decision makers may believe that they control 
processes that are, in fact, determined by chance 
mechanisms (Langer 1975). This is referred to as the 
illusion of control. People under the influence of the 
illusion of control believe that "they might 'beat the 
odds' on a single throw of a die, but not in a series of 
repeated throws" (Koehler, Gibbs, and Hogarth 1994, 189). 
Generally, people whose decisions are biased by the 
illusion of control are aware of the operation of the law 
of large numbers and accordingly know that they cannot 
beat the odds in the long-run. Koehler, Gibbs, and 
Hogarth (1994) found support for the illusion of control 
hypothesis in single-shot, unique gambles but not in 
multi-play gambles.
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Dominant Factor—Consequences of the Outcome
Radioactive leakage from nuclear power plant 
accidents, an explosion of liquefied natural gas 
pipelines, and ozone depletion due to emissions of 
fluorocarbons are considered to be very dangerous and 
extremely risky events. Even though the probability of 
such events occurring is less than 10-10 (Gutmanis and
Jaksch 1984), society does not base its risk perceptions
upon the probability or the expected value of such 
outcomes but upon the consequences of the outcomes. 
Individuals also may ignore probabilities and expected 
values when an outcome has extraordinarily high 
consequences. Expectancy theories (probability times 
consequence) equate a low-probability/high-damage scenario 
with a high-probability/low-damage scenario—which Kaplan 
and Garrick (1981) assert is "definitely not rational." 
Payne and Braunstein (1971) found that the most 
influential factor was the value of the outcome
(consequence) when Pw > PL.
The marketing literature is replete with studies 
of consumer risk perceptions in purchasing decisions for 
which the consequence of the purchase is low (e.g., as in 
buying a new brand of cereal) or high (e.g., purchasing an 
automobile) (Popielarz 1967; Schiffman 1972). In an 
experimental situation, subjects indicated how favorably 
they felt about buying a used car with a given probability
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that the car would need a certain amount of repairs 
(Diamond 1988). The probability and amount of repairs for 
each car were manipulated to create high probability/low 
consequences and low probability/high consequences 
conditions. Diamond (1988) concludes that the size of the 
consequences influences people judging low- 
probability/high-consequence risk more than the 
probability of a specific outcome; in fact, people may 
disregard probability altogether.
Dominant Factor—'Variance of the Outcome
Variance is a factor that appears to dominate 
decision making under uncertainty when the probabilities 
and/or expected values are equal. Subjects choose low 
variance bets when paid according to the outcome of their 
actual bets (Lichtenstein 1965). Lichtenstein (1965) 
suggests that subjects avoided the riskier (greater 
variance) bets because of their fear of losing money.
Just as Lichtenstein's subjects avoided risk, Ghosh and 
Crain (1993) found taxpayers to be less compliant (more
nrisk seeking) the lower the mean and lesser the range of 
the perceived probability of an IRS audit.
7The range is the simplest measure of data 
variation (Ott 1993). The range can be used to estimate the 
standard deviation of a sample, i.e., s = range * 4 (Ott 
1993) .
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Risk Perceptions in Multi-Plav 
vs Single-Play Decisions
To summarize, risk perception has a significant 
influence on decision making under uncertainty.
Generally, decision makers follow the tenets of expected 
utility theory when they make recurring decisions.
However, when a unique decision is required, decision 
makers appear to rely on a particular aspect of an outcome 
(e.g., the probability of a particular outcome or the 
consequences of an outcome). Whether income tax return 
preparers follow these general guides when making tax 
decisions is the topic of this study; it is discussed 
chapter 3.
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HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
The literature reviewed in the preceding chapter 
is applied to income tax return preparers and the 
hypotheses of the study are stated in the first part of 
this chapter. The second part consists of a description 
of the subjects who participated in the study, an 
identification of both the dependent and independent 
variables, an exposition of the proposed covariates, and a 
discussion of the statistical analysis of the data.
Hypotheses
Income tax return preparers need the answers to 
Kaplan and Garrick's (1981) questions to assess the risk 
they associate with making aggressive recommendations for 
income tax filings. The first question is: "What can go 
wrong?" The IRS must examine a client's income tax return 
and challenge a position taken on the return for something 
to go wrong. Then, the IRS must assess the client 
additional taxes and penalties and/or assess the preparer 
penalties for something to go wrong.
The second question is: "How likely is
something to go wrong?" The likelihood of a particular
27
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tax return being selected for examination by the IRS is 
unknown. However, the IRS examines less than 1 percent of
Qthe returns filed and seldom imposes preparer penalties. 
The aggressiveness of recommendations income tax return 
preparers make may be influenced more by their perception 
of the likelihood of a specific return being examined than 
by the relative frequency of the return being examined.
Kaplan and Garrick's third question is: "If 
something goes wrong, what are the consequences?" The 
negative consequences to income tax return preparers for 
making aggressive tax recommendations to clients include 
preparer penalties, damage to professional reputation, 
loss of the client, and loss of the privilege of preparing 
income tax returns. The income tax return preparer's 
loss may be magnified if the preparer pays the penalties 
the IRS assesses his/her clients.10 Many income tax
Q In a recent year, only 80 penalties were imposed 
on all enrolled agents, CPAs, and attorneys in the United 
States. A total of 2,392 penalties were levied against all 
paid income tax preparers (MacDonald 1995; Internal Revenue 
Service 1995).
QThe IRS assesses income tax return preparer 
penalties after discovering an understatement due to (1) an 
unrealistic position or (2) willful, reckless, or 
intentional conduct on an individual's income tax return 
(Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §6694). The preparer penalty 
for taking an unrealistic position is $250 for each return.
A $1,000 preparer penalty applies for each return that has a 
willful, reckless misstatement.
10The IRS may assess taxpayers the following 
penalties (IRC §§6651, 6652, 6663):
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyrigh t ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 9
return preparers pay their clients' penalties if the 
penalties result from a preparer error or recommendation 
(MacDonald 1995). Usually, the penalties paid for clients 
is the largest financial loss or damage professional 
income tax return preparers incur for recommending 
aggressive reporting postures.
Risk to income tax return preparers is composed 
of both the uncertainties associated with the IRS' 
assessing penalties and the damages preparers suffer. 
Although income tax return preparers know the overall IRS 
examination rate, each income tax preparer must determine 
the "plausibility" of the IRS auditing his/her particular 
client's return.11 After combining the "plausibility" of 
an IRS audit with related damages, income tax return 









15% per month up to 75% of underpayment 
5% per month up to 25% of underpayment 
0.5% per month up to 25% of underpayment
Accuracy related 20% of underpayment
Normally, income tax return preparers pay only the failure- 
to-pay and accuracy related penalties the IRS assesses their 
clients.
Kaplan and Garrick (1981, 7) distinguish between 
probability and relative frequency. Probability is 
subjective: "a numerical measure of a state of knowledge, a
degree of belief, a state of confidence"; relative frequency 
"refers to the outcome of an experiment . . . involving
repeated trials." Furthermore, Allais (1983) suggests using 
the "coefficient of plausibility" in lieu of "probability", 
because probability is a nebulous, imprecise measure.
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minimize their clients' taxable incomes to the extent that 
the associated risk is acceptable to the preparer. An 
acceptable level of risk is based upon the uncertainty, 
monetary value, and nonmonetary value of the outcome 
(Fischhoff, et al 1981). Nevertheless, income tax return 
preparers may assess the risk differently for various 
types of decisions.
Multi-Plav Decisions for Income Taxes
How income tax return preparers perceive the
answers to Kaplan and Garrick's questions depend upon 
whether each tax decision (gamble) is viewed as a one-time 
decision or as one in a series of repeated decisions 
(gambles) . If preparers regard these decisions as one in
a series of decisions, then preparers are expected to use
expectancy theory to make decisions. Therefore, 
economically rational income tax return preparers should 
make aggressive recommendations so that their clients pay 
only a minimal amount of taxes. Yet most people pay close 
to their fair share of (legally owed) income taxes (Chang, 
Nichols, and Schultz 1987). This suggests that income tax 
return preparers may view decisions in ambiguous tax areas 
as either one-time gambles or as one in a series of 
gambles.
Income tax return preparers may view reporting 
decisions as multi-play or single-play events. Prior 
research based upon monetary gambles shows that people may
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
3 1
be more aggressive when playing a gamble many times than 
when playing a gamble only once (Joag, Mowen and Gentry 
1990; Keren and Wagenaar 1987; Lopes 1981; Montgomery and 
Adelbratt 1982; and Wedell and Bockenholt 1990). This may 
be partly due to the fact that most gambles examined in 
the literature involve large potential gains that may 
never be realized in the short-run. However, the opposite 
effect occurs in a tax setting: aggressive tax
recommendations involve large potential losses to the 
taxpayer and the preparer that may never be realized in 
the short-run. In the long-run, the law of large numbers 
will operate; accordingly, income tax return preparers 
anticipate a "large loss" if the gamble is played 
repeatedly and a return is eventually audited. The 
greater the number of returns with an aggressive reporting 
posture a preparer completes, the greater the likelihood 
that the IRS will select at least one of those returns for 
examination. Further, IRS regulations prohibit use of the 
"reasonable cause and good faith" exception for imposing 
penalties if there is "a pattern of errors . . .  or 
repetition of the same or similar errors on numerous 
returns" (IRC Reg. §1.6694-2(d)(4)). Therefore, contrary 
to prior research, income tax return preparers may 
perceive greater risk in a situation viewed as a repeated 
play.
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Sinqle-Plav Decisions for Income Taxes
Income tax return preparers may doubt that 
recommending an aggressive position in a single-play event 
will precipitate the assessment of preparer penalties.
They are likely to believe that "winning" (i.e., not 
losing) is more likely in a single-play event because of 
the minuscule number of returns the IRS examines each 
year. Thus income tax return preparers may make more 
aggressive recommendations for unique situations because 
they associate less risk with a short-run (single-play) 
event. While people generally may be overly conservative 
in the short-run, downplaying the importance of large, but 
improbable gains, income tax return preparers may be 
overly aggressive in the short-run, disregarding the 
possibility of large, but improbable losses.
The first hypothesis for this study deals with 
the difference in the risk associated with single-play and 
multi-play decisions. An income tax return preparer may 
make more aggressive recommendations for decisions viewed 
as an isolated occurrence because they associate less risk 
with a short-run (single-play) event.
HA1: Income tax return preparers will
perceive less risk for reporting 
aggressively for a single-play 
decision than for multi-play 
decisions when the potential losses 
to the preparer are identical.
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The second purpose of this research is to 
examine how income tax return preparers make risk 
assessments, i.e., to examine the cognitive algebra that 
income tax return preparers use to formulate tax 
recommendations. Information integration theory 
(Anderson, 1959, 1954, 1974a, etc., summarized in 
Anderson, 1981 and 1982) provides the means to examine the 
cognitive process used in making risk assessments.
The difference in risk hypothesized in the first 
hypothesis is expected to be related to the cognitive 
algebra used by preparers to assess that risk. When a 
gamble is viewed as one of several, it is expected that 
preparers will use a multiplicative model. This 
hypothesis examines the difference in processes used 
across the two types of decisions. Income tax return 
preparers, using a multiplicative model to assess risk, 
multiply the uncertainty of the IRS' assessing a penalty 
by its damages. When the probability of the IRS' 
assessing a penalty is low, the perceived risk will be 
low. As the probability of the IRS' assessing a penalty 
increases, ceteris paribus, perceived risk will increase. 
If the probability is being crossed by the damages, 
however, the risk associated with a large penalty 
(consequence) will increase faster than the risk 
associated with a small penalty resulting in a diverging 
fan shape as shown in panel A, figure 3 (i.e., the
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difference in perceived risk between small and large 
penalties will increase as the probability of the IRS' 
assessing a penalty increases) . The difference between 
the risk perceived for large and small penalties for 
repeated decisions will be greatest when the probability 
of the IRS' assessing a penalty is high. Income tax 
return preparers are expected to use a multiplicative 
model for repeated decisions. The second hypothesis is:
hA2 : Income tax return preparers will combine
information on probabilities and damages 
consistent with a multiplicative model when 
making multi-play decisions.
For single-play decisions, income tax return 
preparers are expected to forego a multiplicative model 
and instead, may either (1) add the probability of the 
IRS' assessing a penalty to the damages (see panel B, 
figure 3) or (2) ignore the probability of the IRS' 
assessing a penalty (see panel C, figure 3). Perceived 
risk will increase slowly as shown in panel B, figure 3 as 
the probability of a penalty increases if an additive 
model is used and probability is added to consequence to 
determine total perceived risk. If the probability of the
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Panel A - Multiplicative Model
High orf*-
Ii  CO
1  ir Small Penalty
Low
Low High'
Probability of the IRS' A ssess in g  Penalties
Panel B - Additive Model
Highi
•§ COo  •••
Large Penalty
Small Penalty^
Low —------- - ^
Cow High
Probability of the IRS' A ssess in g  Penalties
Panel C - Probability Ignored in Addivitive Model
Highi
Ii  co Large Penalty1 Sa. “ ■ Small Penalty
Low
Cow High
Probability of the IRS' A ssess in g  P enalties
Figure 3. Perceived Risk of Reporting 
Aggressively on Income Tax Returns
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IRS' assessing a penalty is ignored, i.e., probability is 
assigned a value of zero, and if the income tax return
preparer uses an additive model, the perceived risk will
remain constant when probability is manipulated (see 
panel C, figure 3). When probabilities are ignored, risk 
perceptions are independent of the probability of the IRS' 
assessing penalties. Income tax return preparers are not 
expected to use a multiplicative model for single-play 
decisions. The third hypothesis is:
HA3: Income tax return preparers will
combine information on probabilities 
and damages consistent with an 
additive model when making single-play 
decisions.
The source of the data and the statistical 
analysis used to test the three hypotheses of this study
are discussed in the next section.
Methodology 
Overview of Task
Subjects will assess their perceived risk of 
recommending aggressive reporting positions on a client's 
tax return and indicate whether they would report 
aggressively in an ambiguous situation in a laboratory 
experiment. The ambiguous tax topic involves prepaid 
health care expenses. Subjects will complete the 
instrument while attending continuing professional 
education courses, by mail, or by facsimile. The study
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will utilize a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects design. The 
test instrument will consist of a case scenario, a 
monetary and ethical risk preference instrument, and a 
demographic questionnaire. Subjects will also be 
furnished a summary of the relevant tax authorities along 
with a complete copy of the relevant Internal Revenue Code 
and Regulations sections, and a complete copy of a court 
case.
Subjects
Subjects for this investigation will be income 
tax return preparers employed by CPA or law firms who are 
either attending continuing professional education courses 
or were selected at random from the current edition of the 
Yellow Pages of several major cities. Approximately 300 
subjects will participate in this study.
Independent Variables
The independent variables for this study are (1) 
type of decision (single or repeated), (2) probability
(high or low), and (3) negative consequence of the 
outcomes (large/high or small/low). The same three 
independent variables are used for all three hypotheses.
Type of Decision. The two types of decisions 
(single or repeated) will be operationalized by giving 
one-third of the subjects questions concerning perceived 
risk about one client's income tax return and the other
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two-thirds questions about several clients' income tax
returns. The wording of the manipulation will be:
Single-play: None of your other clients have
this type of deduction this year.
Multi-play: At least 10 of your clients have
a similar type and amount of deduction this 
year.
Probability. HA2 an<i postulate that income 
tax return preparers combine the probability of a negative 
consequence with the value of reporting aggressively in 
making decisions and assessing risk. The manipulation of 
the probability of the IRS' assessing a penalty is 
essential for observing whether income tax return 
preparers follow expectancy theories. The probability of 
the IRS' assessing a penalty will be manipulated at two 
levels: (1) high—item of income or deduction is of great
interest to the IRS District Director and (2) low—income 
or deduction item is not of interest to the IRS District 
Director. Professional income tax preparers may balk at 
making a decision without obtaining a private letter 
ruling especially in the high consequence/high probability 
condition. To encourage the subjects to make a decision, 
the item will be one for which "the Service will not issue 
advance rulings or determination letters. . . . because
those matters are under extensive study" (Rev Proc 95-3). 
This independent variable will be operationalized as 
follows:
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High Probability: The IRS District Director
for your area was recently quoted as saying,
"We (the IRS in your district) will actively 
pursue overly aggressive deductions for 
medical care extending beyond one year even 
though the National Office is not making 
advance rulings on this issue."
Low Probability: The IRS District Director
for your area was recently quoted as saying,
"We (the IRS in your district) believe that 
the interests of taxpayers, income tax return 
preparers, and the government are best served 
by waiting until the National Office 
completes its study of issues, e.g., medical 
care extending beyond one year before 
committing resources to those areas. When 
the National Office refuses to issue advance 
rulings, any additional taxes we (the IRS) 
may collect may be refunded following 
completion of the National Office's study."
Negative Consequences. The IRS can assess
1 0income tax return preparers penalties. In addition to 
the preparer penalties, costs imposed on the preparers' 
clients may be relevant especially if the clients' cost 
are internalized by the preparer as sometimes happens.
When CPAs make errors or recommend aggressive tax 
positions that result in the IRS' assessing their client 
penalties, CPAs may also pay the penalties the IRS 
assesses their clients. Negative monetary consequences to 
the preparers will be operationalized at two levels, 
large/high and small/low. The taxpayer will be subject to
1 2There are two basic types of preparer 
penalties—the unrealistic position penalty which is $250 and 
the willful, reckless, or intentional conduct on an 
individual's tax return penalty which is $1,000 (IRC §6694).
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only the late payment penalty of 0.5% per month in the 
small/low consequence condition. The amount for the 
small/low consequence condition is $150 ($1,500 tax
underpaid times 20 months13 at 0.5% per month underpayment 
penalty) . In the large/high consequence condition, the 
taxpayer will be subject to both the 20% substantial 
understatement penalty and the 0.5% per month late payment 
penalty that will total $5,000 ($16,700 tax underpaid 
times 20% substantial understatement penalty plus 20 
months at 0.5% per month underpayment penalty).
Assessment of the substantial understatement penalty makes 
it more difficult for the preparer to invoke the good 
faith exception to the levy of preparer penalties. Since 
the amount of the tax related to the income or deduction 
(instead of the amount of the income or deduction) will be 
used, the need for tax rates and the related bias will be 
eliminated. While subjective (nonmonetary) consequences 
are relevant to tax issues, the author assumes that most 
income tax return preparers will suffer the same intensity 
of nonmonetary consequences regardless of the amount of 
the monetary consequences.14
13The underpayment penalty generally runs from the 
due date of the return, April 15, until the examination of 
the return is completed. Most examinations are completed 
within two years, which is 20 months after the due date of 
the return.
14This is not true if the preparer incurs fraud 
penalties. However, this study does not include variable
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It may be argued that one potential loss of 
$5,000 is not equivalent to 10 potential losses of $500 
each. On the other hand, one may argue that the risk 
perceived for a single potential loss of $5,000 is not 
comparable to that perceived for a potential loss of 
$50,000 (10 possible losses of $5,000 each). However, if 
the difference in the perceived risk between a one-time 
loss of $5,000 and 10 losses of $500 is similar to and in 
the same direction as that between the one-time loss of 
$5,000 and 10 repeated losses of $5,000, the argument will 
not be applicable to this study. Therefore, a control 
group is used to manipulate the negative consequences in 
the multi-play condition two ways. In the first 
manipulation, the subjects will assess the perceived risk 
for 10 clients reporting aggressively when each client has 
the same potential penalty as the client in the single­
play condition. The potential penalty for each of the 10 
clients in the control group will be one-tenth of that for 
the client in the single-play condition. The wording for 
the manipulation of this independent variable is:
Large/High Consequence: This deduction will
reduce your client's (clients') income taxes 
by $16,700 ($1,670) . . . .  Your client 
(clients) may be assessed a penalty of $5,000 
($500) if this deduction is disallowed.
Small/Low Consequence: This deduction will
reduce your client's (clients') income taxes
manipulations that are likely to be subject to fraud 
penalties.
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by $1,500 ($150).... Your client (clients) 
could be assessed a penalty of $150 ($15) if 
this deduction is disallowed.
Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables will be measured. The
first is the perceived risk associated with reporting 
aggressively on a tax return (single return or several 
returns). The subjects will mark their responses to a 
case scenario applicable to the hypotheses on a Galton bar 
scale anchored by "very low risk, 0" and "very high risk, 
100" as displayed below:
Very Low Very High
Risk Risk
! ...........i .......... I . . . .,....! ............ ! !
o  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i o o
Using both an "attractiveness" scale (e.g., very 
low risk) and a "numerical scale" (e.g., 0, 100) removes
the bias toward probability in the attractiveness scale
and toward money in the numerical scale (Mullet 1992). A 
continuous scale divided into 100 points, similar to the 
one above, was used by Troutman and Shanteau (1976) to 
measure the risk and preference for an alternative in a 
study of decision making under uncertainty. Joag (1985) 
used the Galton bar scale to measure perceived risk in an 
industrial purchasing experiment.
The second dependent variable will indicate 
whether the subjects would, in fact, report conservatively 
or aggressively. For example:
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Do you recommend taking the deduction on this 
(all these) client's(s') tax return(s)?
Yes__________ No______________
Covariates
By building extraneous variables into the 
research design, one can obtain additional information 
about the effect of the variables on the dependent 
variables and achieve control (Kerlinger 1986) . Both 
financial and ethical risks are applicable to income tax 
decision making. Jackson and Milliron (1986) report that 
15 of 16 studies that included ethics as a variable found 
that increasing the magnitude of the compliance variable 
(ethics) was associated with higher levels of voluntary 
tax compliance; the results of the other study were 
indeterminate.
Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991) found that risk- 
neutral subjects made different tax reporting decisions 
than risk-averse subjects. Therefore, this study will 
control for both the financial and ethical risk 
preferences of the subjects. Risk seeking subjects will 
perceive less risk associated with both single-play and 
multi-play decisions than risk neutral subjects. 
Conversely, risk averse subjects will perceive a greater 
risk in both conditions. Subjects with extreme risk 
preferences will mask the effects due to type of decision
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because the variability between subjects will cause risk 
perception for a single client decision and multi-client 
decisions to be coincident (Montgomery 1991). Therefore, 
it is imperative to control for risk preferences. The 
author will discern whether the subjects are risk-neutral, 
risk-seeking, or risk-averse by using the portion of the 
Jackson Personality Inventory relating to risk and ethics 
(Jackson 1994).
In addition to the possible risk covariates, the 
age, size of firm, household income, and gender of the 
income tax return preparer will be tested for covariation 
with the dependent variable, perceived risk.
Statistical Analysis
Results of the study will be analyzed using 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) and logistic regression 
(logit). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used if the 
proposed covariates are insignificant or do not meet the 
assumptions of ANCOVA.
HAi Support. HA1 will be supported if those 
making decisions for one client are more aggressive 
(perceive less risk) than those making decisions for 
several. This will be evidenced by a significant main 
effect for type of decision.
hA2 Support. Subjects will use a multiplicative 
model for decisions applicable to several clients and an 
additive model for those applicable to only one client.
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In general, the test for a multiplicative model using 
information integration theory requires the finding of (1) 
significant main effects for probability and consequences,
(2) significant consequences by probability interaction,
(3) significant interaction in the bilinear component, and
(4) nonsignificant residual components. If the 
consequence by probability interaction is nonsignificant, 
one rejects the multiplicative model in favor of a 
nonmultiplicative model (Anderson 1982; Shanteau 1984).
The means of the data will plot as diverging fan shaped 
lines for multiplicative models.
hA3 Support. No probability by consequence 
interaction in decisions applicable to only one client 
will provide support for an additive model. The means of 
the data will plot as parallel curves for additive models.
The penultimate chapter reports the 
demographical characteristics of the CPAs and attorneys 
who participated in this study concomitant with the 
results of the statistical analyses of the data.




This chapter presents the results of the 
statistical tests made to determine whether empirical data 
support the hypotheses of this study. First, a demography 
of the tax preparers is presented. The results of tests 
establishing that the subjects were randomly assigned to 
each group will follow the discussion of the demography. 
The final section of this chapter will incorporate both 
measures of perceived risk in a discussion of the tests of 
the hypotheses.
Descriptive Data
The hypotheses generated in the preceding 
chapter apply to the population of subjects who could 
suffer financial losses as a result of their decisions, 
i.e., sole practitioners and partners in small CPA firms 
rather than employees of large international accounting 
firms. For the manipulation of the variables to be 
salient, the tax preparers must regard the risk they 
associate with their decisions as personal risk, believe 
that the tax issue is both valid and ambiguous, and base 
their decisions upon the scenarios stated in the case.
46
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
4 7
Therefore, the subjects’ attitude toward the risk they 
perceive for themselves, the believability of the tax 
issue, the ambiguity of the tax issue, and their prior 
experience with prepaid medical deductions will be 
addressed following the discourse on said subjects. 
Demographics of Subjects
In total 244 tax preparers participated in this 
study: 182 participated in the primary study and an
additional 62 participated in the control group. The 
total includes 140 attendees of two-day professional 
development income tax seminars sponsored by state CPA 
societies. The other 104 subjects were randomly selected 
from local CPA firms listed in the Yellow Pages of four 
major cities in Texas and one in Louisiana. Most of the 
multifarious subjects practice public accounting in Texas 
or Louisiana. A few of the subjects are tax attorneys. 
Demographics for the income tax return preparers who 
participated in the study are summarized in table 2 .
Despite their somewhat diverse demographics, 
most of the subjects do, in fact, bear the financial 
burden of their decisions, since 32% are sole 
practitioners who have no professional employees and 
another 24% are either sole practitioners who have one or 
two professional employees or are partners in firms 
consisting of one or two professionals besides themselves. 
The average age of the subjects is 45.8 years and ranges
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T A B L E  2
Summary of Subject Demographics Based Upon The Number 
of Responses For Each Characteristic







30 and Under 18 7.5
31 - 40 65 26.9
41 - 50 89 37.0
Over 50 69 28.6
Tax Experience (Years)
Less Than 6 19 8.1
6 - 1 0 32 13.7
11 - 20 88 37.6
Over 20 95 40.6
Size of Firm (Number of
1 - 3 119 56.1
4 - 1 0 43 20.3
11 - 25 28 13.2
Over 25 22 10.4





Accounting Or Taxation 23 9.5
Other 17 7.1
Law Degree 23 9.5
All Others 5 2.1
Household Income
Under $50,000 37 17.8
$50,000 and Less Than $100,000 107 51.4
$100,000 and Over 64 30.8
aThe number of subjects shown for each variable may differ 
because of missing data. The number of subjects in each 
group is reported in appendix A.
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from 23 to 76 years. Household income ranges from $26,500 
to more than $500,000, with a mean of $101,120 and a 
median of $90,000. While over 25% of the subjects hold an 
advanced college degree, the highest level of education 
completed for 71.8% of the subjects was a bachelor’s 
degree. The highest level of education completed ranges 
from high school to completion of all the course work for 
a doctoral degree.
The subjects were randomly assigned to the 12
1 5  1 figroups used m  this between subjects study. The model
used to test random assignment of subjects was:
Demographical Variable = Dec_Type + Prob + Cons +
Prob X Prob + Prob X Cons + 
Dec_Type X Prob X Cons.
Panel A, table 3 displays the mean and p-value for each 
characteristic when it was used as the dependent variable 
in an analysis of variance test to verify the hypothesis 
that the characteristic is the same for each of the eight
The primary study is a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial. A 
third classification of decision type, fraction of multi­
play, was included as a control group. The primary analysis 
includes only the eight groups of the 23 factorial. All 
analyses are for the primary eight groups unless otherwise 
stated.
16 In the model, Dec_Type is decision type, Prob is 
the probability of the IRS's assessing a penalty, Cons is 
the monetary consequences to the income tax preparer of 
penalties assessed by the IRS on the income tax return 
preparer's client(s).




Panel A: ANOVA Primary Study Total Sample
Characteristic Mean Pr > F Mean Pr > F
Age 45.8 0.1803 45.3 0.0056
Size of Firm 11.4 0.1806 10 .6 0.2609
Household Income $101,120 0.4506 $102,041 0.3973
Years Tax 
Experience
19.3 0.4766 19 . 0 0.1859
Highest Education 
Attained3
1.3 0.6678 1.7 0.7554
Traditional Values*3 75 . 9 0.5449 76.1 0.6874
Financial Riskc 56.0 0.1806 57.5 0.1968
Number Clients With 
Similar Tax Issue
. 6 0.1849 0.8 0.0676
Panel B : X2 Primary Study Total Sample











aLess than Bachelor's 
Master's Degree = 2, 
Degree = 4.
Degree = 0, Bachelor's = 1,
Law Degree = 3, More than Master's
DScale 0 - 100. Higher score indicates 
values.
more traditional
cScale 0 - 100. Higher score indicates 
propensity.
greater risk
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groups in the "Primary Study" columns and each of the 
twelve groups in the "Total Sample" columns. Panel B, 
table 3 shows the percent of females in the sample and the 
p-values for chi-square goodness of fit tests for gender 
and location.
For the primary study, there were no differences 
in the composition of the groups as to age, gender, size 
of firm, household income, years of tax experience, level 
of education, attitudes toward ethical risk (traditional 
values), attitudes toward financial risk, prior experience 
with the tax issue, or geographic location of the subjects 
across the eight groups: the p-values ranged from 0.1803
for age to 0.6678 for highest level of education attained. 
For the total sample, which included the data for the four 
control groups (fraction of multi-play decisions groups), 
the only difference in demographics was in age. The 
subjects in the fraction of multi-play decision groups 
(mean age 43.9 years) are significantly younger than those 
in the multi-play and single play decision groups (mean 
age 45.8 years) . However, the twelve groups did not 
differ in relevant experience in tax preparation, gender, 
education, or household income.
The subjects were, in fact, randomly assigned to 
the twelve groups in this study as shown by the data in 
table 3 and appendix A. The second part of the random 
assignment verification looks at the subjects' opinions
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about the case scenario, etc., which may affect income tax 
return preparers' perceived risk of reporting aggressively 
on clients' income tax returns.
Opinions of Subiecta and Other Potential Confounders
Tests for random assignment of the subjects to 
the twelve groups based upon their opinions about their 
personal risk, the believability of the issue (prepaid 
medical expenses), the ambiguity of the tax issue, and 
their prior experience with the tax issue will be 
discussed next. The model used to test the demographical 
variables for random assignment of subjects to groups 
discussed in the preceding section was also used to test 
that the groups were equivalent with respect to the 
believability and the ambiguity of the tax issue. The 
chi-square goodness-of-fit test was used to determine the 
random assignment of subjects based upon their prior 
experience with the tax issue and their personal risk.
Personal Risk. One debriefing question was "Is 
the amount of risk you perceive for yourself different 
from that you perceive for your firm? (Explain) ." Eighty- 
six percent of the respondents answered "No." Most of the 
respondents making comments replied "I am the firm" 
(partner or sole practitioner). Two other explanations 
for the subject's risk being the same as the firm's risk 
are "I sign the tax returns" and "my employee/agency 
relationship with the firm." Explanations for personal
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risk being different from the firm's risk included: an
employee has no risk, the firm pays the penalties, the 
firm carries professional liability insurance, the firm's 
obligation to clients, partners' take more risk satisfying 
clients, the firm could lose the client, and the employee 
has to pay the penalty instead of the firm.
Table 4 reveals that approximately 86% of the 
respondents believed that their risk and the firm's risk 
are the same. As expected, the chi-square goodness of fit 
test reveals that the distribution of subjects who 
considered their risk to be identical to that of the firm 
is uniform across all groups for both the primary study 
(p-value 0.496) and the total sample (p-value 0.533).
Prior Experience. For a salient manipulation of 
the variables, income tax return preparers must base their
TABLE 4
Test of Random Assignment of Subjects to Groups Based upon 
Their Opinions and Other Potential Confounders
Panel A: X2 Primary Study Total Sample
Factor Percent Pr > X2 Percent Pr > X2
Personal Risk 
Yes = 0; No = 1
86.4 0 .496 85.6 0 . 533
Prior Experience 86.5 0 . 725 85.6 0 . 521
Panel B: ANOVA Mean Pr > F Mean Pr > F
Believability 0 .6898 0 .2925 0 .6888 0.3432
Ambiguity 0.5521 0.7398 0.6616 0.6002
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decisions upon the data presented in the case instead of 
upon their prior experience with medical deduction issues. 
The subjects were asked to describe their prior experience 
with similar tax issues. The exact instructions were: 
"Describe any situations that you have encountered in 
practice concerning prepaid medical expenses."
This was followed by the question "How many of 
your clients have had similar tax problems?" Eighty-six 
percent of the subjects indicated that they had not 
encountered a similar prepaid medical deduction issue in 
their practice. Of the 26 subjects who reported having 
previous experience with the prepaid medical expense 
issue, 21 reported that the issue had been encountered on 
less than five of their clients' income tax returns. The 
other five subjects reported that 10 to 30 of their 
clients had similar tax problems. A chi-square goodness 
of fit test was used to test that the proportion of 
subjects encountering similar prepaid medical deductions 
in their practices was uniform across all groups. With a 
p-value of 0.521, for the total sample and 0.725 for the 
primary study, the similar composition of groups 
hypothesis was not rejected. This lack of prior 
experience with the tax issue and equivalent groups leads 
to the conclusion that the subjects were making decisions 
based upon the facts presented in the case scenario rather 
than upon their prior experiences with the issue.
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Believability. Besides feeling that a 
possibility of personal loss exists, the subjects must 
believe that they are assessing risk for deductions that 
are plausible for the dependent variable, i.e., perceived 
risk, to be meaningful. The question in the debriefing 
portion of the data collection instrument to ascertain 
this is: "How believable was the issue?" Subjects 
responded on a six-point (140 centimeters) scale where 
zero was described as "Very Unbelievable" and six was 
described as "Very Believable." Since the response scales 
were arbitrarily set at 140 centimeters, the results were 
converted to a zero to one scale to eliminate the need for 
the reader to remember the length of each scale while 
reading this study.
The mean response for believability of the tax 
issue shown in table 4 is 0.6898 and did not differ 
significantly across the eight groups. The mean 
believability for the eight groups ranged from 0.60 to 
0.76. Subjects provided evidence that the scenario was 
very realistic as 25% marked the highest decile compared 
to only 3.8% who marked the lowest decile. In total,
72.6% indicated that the scenario was more than 50% 
believable whereas only four subjects thought it was very 
unbelievable. An analysis of variance test with 
believability of the issue as the dependent variable, 
p-value 0.2925, failed to reject the hypothesis that all
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the groups held similar views about the believability of 
the tax issue. The same conclusions were reached 
regarding the total sample.
Ambiguity. A test of the first possible 
confounder was necessary to establish that the subjects 
believed that the tax issue was ambiguous. When there is 
only one correct way to handle a specific tax item, CPAs 
are required to report the item correctly on their 
clients' income tax returns (AICPA 1988} . However, CPAs 
are permitted to take aggressive positions on clients' 
income tax returns when items are ambiguous.
To ascertain the subjects' attitude toward the 
ambiguity of the issue, the debriefing section included 
the question: "Mark the scale below to answer: 'Do you 
think the scenario is clear cut?'" The six-point (140
centimeters) scale was anchored by zero, "Very Clear Cut
Only One Possible Correct Answer," and six, "No Correct 
Answer." The responses were converted to a zero to one 
scale to eliminate the need for the reader to remember the
scale when reading the results. The mean response was
0.5521. The responses for the single play and multi-play 
decision type groups ranged from 0.4946 to 0.6238. Only 
four of the subjects considered prepaid medical expenses 
not to be an ambiguous tax issue. When ambiguity was used 
as the dependent variable in the ANOVA model shown in the 
demographics of subjects section of this chapter, the
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p-value was 0.7398 for the eight groups in the primary 
study and 0.725 for all 12 groups. P-values that large 
supports the conclusion that ambiguity of the issue was 
the same for all the groups.
These results suggest that the subjects were 
making decisions for which they could incur a personal 
loss, and were basing their decisions upon the facts 
presented in the test case which they believed were both 
realistic and ambiguous. This, in turn, leads to the 
conclusion that the subjects were randomly assigned to the 
groups in the study and that the results were not 
confounded by these factors; therefore, the results can be 
attributed to the independent constructs.
Hypotheses
The results of analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
that test the significance of the proposed covariates 
(ethical and financial risk and four other demographic 
characteristics) are presented first. This is followed by 
a brief discussion of the assumptions of ANOVA/ANCOVA and 
the appropriateness of ANOVA for testing the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 3. The remainder of this section 
examines the ANOVA tests of the hypotheses.
Covariates
Six characteristics of the subjects were tested 
for possible covariation with income tax return preparers’ 
perceived risk of reporting aggressively on clients’
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income tax returns. A discussion of the subjects’ risk
propensities will be followed by a discussion of four
other characteristics that may influence income tax return
preparers’ risk perceptions. Table 5 contains the results
of a test to determine whether one or more of the
covariates should be included in the model to test the
hypotheses. The ANCOVA model used to determine if, in
fact, preparers’ risk propensities and the other four
demographic characteristics moderate the perceived risk
that income tax return preparers associate with reporting
aggressively on clients’ income tax returns is:
Perceived Risk = ERISK + FRISK + Age + Size + Income + 
Dec_Type + Prob + Cons + Dec_Type X Prob + 
Dec_Type X Prob X Cons + Dec_Type X Cons + Prob 
X Cons + Gender
Risk Propensities. The subjects’ traditional 
values, i.e., ethical risk, and financial risk 
propensities were measured using the combined male and 
female norms for the percentile equivalents of the JPI-R 
raw scores. Only 127 observations were included in this 
test because of missing data for some of the covariates. 
Neither of the potential risk covariates were significant. 
When all six of the demographic characteristics are in the 
model, the p-values, as shown in table 5, are 0.5252 and 
0.9837 for traditional values (ERISK) and financial risk 
(FRISK) respectively. Omitting one risk covariate from 
the model does not make the other risk covariate 
significant. The p-value for FRISK is 0.6027 when ERISK
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T A B L E  5
Test of Covariates
Multi-Play, Single Play, and Control Groups
General Linear Models Procedure
Dependent Variable: Perceived Risk
Sum of
Source DF Squares F Value Pr > Fa
Model 13 33035.221 4.49 0.0001
Error 113 64007.246
Corrected Total 126 97042.467
R-Square C.V. Perceived Risk
0.340420 45.09026 52.783
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr > Fa
GENDER 1 938.264 1.66 0.2007
ERISK 1 230.088 0 .41 0.5252
FRISK 1 0.237 0.00 0.9837
AGE 1 132.956 0 .23 0.6290
SIZE 1 671.749 1.19 0.2785
INCOME 1 2233.167 3 . 94 0.0495
DEC TYPE 1 548.511 0 . 97 0.3272
PROB 1 2173.849 3 . 84 0.0526
DEC TYPE*PROB 1 269.652 0.48 0.4916
CONS 1 27044.285 47.74 0.0001
DEC TYPE*CONS 1 488.638 0.86 0.3550
PROB*CONS 1 103.026 0 .18 0.6706
DEC TYPE*
PROB*CONS 1 1.151 0 . 00 0.9641
aTwo-tail test.
is omitted. When FRISK is excluded from the analysis, the 
p-value for ERISK is 0.3800 which is also nonsignificant.
Perfectly correlated variables have a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of ±1. The Pearson correlation
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
6 0
coefficient for ERISK and FRISK is - 0.23103 which means 
that ERISK and FRISK are not correlated. The probability 
of obtaining a coefficient as small as 10.231031 when the 
variables are correlated is 0.0018. Financial risk 
(FRISK) and traditional values (ERISK) were not expected 
to be correlated because items in the JPI-R are not 
correlated. Since these two covariates are not 
significant, ERISK and FRISK are excluded from the final 
model.
Moderating Effects of Other Characteristics.
Prior research shows that certain demographic variables 
influence taxpayers’ income tax reporting decisions 
(Jackson and Milliron 1986). Four of these variables may 
influence income tax return preparers as well as 
taxpayers. Three of these variables were included as 
covariates in the ANCOVA model. The fourth, gender, was 
included as a classification variable. The results of 
this analysis are discussed next.
Gender is the first characteristic examined. 
Generally, males are considered more risk seeking than 
females. Since females comprised 28% of the subjects in 
this study and may not be distributed equally across the 
groups (p-value = 0.087, table 3), the results could be 
biased if the females perceive more risk than their male 
counterparts. To test for a gender effect, gender was 
added to the ANCOVA model as an independent variable. The
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results (p-value 0.2007), which are presented in table 5, 
indicate that females do not perceive more risk than males 
in reporting aggressively on clients’ income tax returns. 
Neither do the results change when the observations for 
females are eliminated from the analyses. The conclusion 
is that there is no difference between males and females 
in the amount of risk perceived for reporting aggressively 
on clients’ income tax returns.
Another characteristic that prior research shows 
to be related to reporting aggressively on income tax 
returns is age. Younger tax preparers’ may perceive less 
risk in taking an aggressive position on a client’s income 
tax return because, generally, their own net worth is 
lower than that of older tax preparers. Again, age was 
added to the ANCOVA model as a covariate to test whether 
age influences income tax return preparers in assuming 
aggressive postures on tax issues. The results shown in 
table 5 suggest that age with an alpha value of 0.6290 
definitely does not have an impact upon tax preparers’ 
perceived risk of reporting aggressively on clients’ 
income tax returns.
The third characteristic considered in this 
study that may affect income tax reporting is household 
income. Generally, the higher the income the greater the 
opportunity to avoid/evade income taxes. Income tax 
return preparers’ concept of materiality and, therefore,
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their perceived risk of reporting aggressively on clients’ 
income tax returns may be affected by their own household 
income and their own opportunities to avoid/evade income 
taxes. Thus income tax return preparers with higher 
incomes and greater opportunities to avoid/evade income 
taxes may perceive less risk in reporting aggressively on 
clients’ income tax returns than preparers with lower 
incomes. Household income was significant at the 0.0495 
level when included in the model as a covariate (see 
table 5). This variable in included in the model to test 
whether the assumptions of ANCOVA are satisfied. The 
results of this test are discussed later in this chapter.
The fourth demographic characteristic considered 
is size of firm. The larger the firm the greater the 
number of professionals to share the damages. Prorating 
the potential losses among several preparers may lead to 
lower perceived risk. The results shown in table 5 
indicate that size of firm with a p-value of 0.2785 did 
not have an effect on income tax return preparers’ 
perceived risk of reporting aggressively on clients’ 
income tax returns.
The lack of significance for three of these 
variables indicates that the amount of perceived risk 
associated with reporting aggressively on clients’ income 
tax returns is not affected by the subjects' gender, age, 
or size of firm. Household income of income tax return
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preparers, the fourth variable, was significant and may 
skew the results of the study if the sample is not 
representative of the entire population of income tax 
return preparers. The assumptions of ANCOVA and ANOVA as 
applied to this study are addressed in the following 
section.
ANCOVA/ANOVA Assumptions
Analysis of covariance is used when other 
quantitative variables affect the response variable (in 
this case perceived risk) of interest (Ott 1993). The 
assumptions (on perceived risk) of ANCOVA include those of 
ANOVA which are: (1) homogeneity of variance, (2)
normality, and (3) independence. Besides the three ANOVA 
assumptions, a fourth assumption, homogeneity of slopes, 
is essential to obtain valid results from ANCOVA. Each of 
these assumptions are addressed below.
Homogeneity of Variance. Hartley’s test for the 
equality of variances rejects the hypothesis of equal 
population variances if the test statistic is greater than 
4.61 for an a-level of .05 for eight groups with a sample 
size of 20 in each group. Fmay, the test statistic, for 
the eight groups in the primary study is 8.07 which is far 
greater than the 4.61 rejection level. However, if the 
single play, low probability, low consequence (SLL) group 
is omitted, the critical value using only the remaining 
seven groups is 3.94 and the test statistic is 1.77.
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Although seven of the eight groups do have equal 
variances, an additional test was conducted for equality 
of variances.
Levene’s test of homogeneity of group variances 
"was shown to be nearly as good as Barlett’s test and 
Harltey’s test for normally distributed data and superior 
to them for non-normally distributed data" (Milliken and 
Johnson 1992, 22). Using all eight groups in the primary 
study, Levene’s test has a p-value of 0.0035 which 
supports the conclusion that the variances are unequal.
Normality. The Shapiro-Wilk procedure which 
tests the null hypothesis that the data in all groups are 
normally distributed, was employed first. The WtNormal 
test statistic from this procedure for the eight groups 
has a p-value of 0.0001 which indicates that the data is 
not normally distributed. Next, each of the groups was 
separately tested using the Shapiro Wilk procedure. Only 
two of the eight groups were not normally distributed. 
ANCOVA and ANOVA are robust to violations of the normality 
assumption when cell sizes are equal or roughly the same 
size and variances are roughly equal. "Roughly the same 
size" means no one group is more than 1.5 times larger or 
smaller than the other groups (Hays 1994). The smallest 
group in this study has 17 observations; the largest group 
has 24. Therefore, the groups in this study are roughly 
the same size.
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In this study, the SLL (single play, low 
probability, low consequence) group with 17 useable (18 
total) observations is the smallest group and, also, has 
the smallest variance, 67.2529. The group with the 
largest variance, 669.9644, is the MHL (multi-play, high 
probability, low consequence) group, which is the second 
largest group with 22 useable (23 total) observations.
The largest group has 24 useable observations. According 
to Stevens (1990) if the smaller variance is associated 
with the smaller group and the larger variance is 
associated with the larger group, as it is in this study, 
the F-statistic for ANOVA is actually more conservative 
than usual and the null hypothesis will not be rejected as 
often as it should.
Independence. One of the strengths of between 
subjects studies is that the observations are independent. 
Very few of the subjects were from the same firm. The 
subjects selected from the Yellow Pages and those from one 
of the professional development courses did not have an 
opportunity to communicate with other subjects prior to 
completion of the data collection instrument. Therefore 
one infers that the assumption of independence is met.
Homogeneity of Slopes. The SAS procedure Proc 
GLM was used to test the equality of slopes of the 
regression equations. Type I sum of squares are used to 
interpret the results of this test. Type I sum of squares
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
6 6
indicate the amount of variability explained by each 
variable as it is added to the model. A variable should 
be included as a covariate "If the covariate is 
significant and the interaction of the covariate and the 
main effects is not significant . . . "  (University of 
Texas Statistical Consulting 1993). The p-value for 
income from the Type I sum of squares when the main 
effects are already in the model is 0.1215 and the p-value 
for the highest level interaction term (income X decision 
type X probability X consequence) is 0.6311. Neither the 
covariate nor the highest level interaction term is 
significant. Thus using the University of Texas 
Statistical Consulting’s test interpretation, the 
homogeneity of slope assumption has been violated and 
income does not vary with perceived risk in the manner 
specified for covariates.
To further test the ANCOVA assumption of equal 
slopes, a general model allowing for different intercepts 
and different slopes was fit to the data. The F-test with 
seven (7) numerator degrees of freedom has a p-value of 
0.1885 for the primary study and 0.4356 for the control 
group. Therefore, one concludes that the slopes are the 
same and that ANCOVA is the appropriate model to test the 
hypotheses.
ANOVA Used. As discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, the only significant covariate, household
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T A B L E  6
Test of Effect of Decision Type, Probability, and 
Consequence on Income Tax Return Preparers' 
Perceived Risk of Reporting Aggressively on 
Clients' Income Tax Returns Using ANCOVA
General Linear Models Procedure
Multi-Play and Single Play Data 
Dependent Variable: Perceived Risk
Source DF Sum of Squares F Value Pr >
Model 8 3 .38215326 7. 67 0.000
Error 13 5 7.44100565
Corrected
Total 143 10 . 82315890
R-Square C.V. RISK Mean
0.312492 44.02786 0.53323837
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr >
PROB 1 0.29963811 5 .44 0 . 0212
DEC TYPE 1 0.06553086 1.19 0 .2775
PROB*DEC TYPE 1 0.10370473 1.88 0.1724
CONS 1 2.75170872 49 . 92 0.0001
PROB*CONS 1 0 .02608036 0.47 0.4927
DEC TYPE*CONS 1 0.04552038 0 . 83 0.3651
PROB*DEC TYPE
*CONS 1 0.00737993 0 .13 0.7150
INCOME 1 0 .21650085 3.93 0.0495
income, varies with perceived risk in a systematic 
fashion; therefore, the ANCOVA model is suitable for 
testing the hypotheses. However, approximately 20% of the 
subjects failed to report their household income. Using 
the ANCOVA model to test for significance of the covariate 
household income was only marginally significant (p-value
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0.0495). Comparing the p-values of ANCOVA in table 6 with 
those of ANOVA in table 7, one arrives at the same 
conclusions regarding the significance of the three 
factors (decision type, probability, and consequence) and 
their interactions. Since ANOVA includes more of the data 
than ANCOVA (see appendix A), the results of ANOVA are 
reported. The assumptions of ANOVA will be reviewed next 
to determine whether ANOVA should be used.
Independence of observations is the only ANOVA 
assumption that is not violated. Normality and 
homogeneity of variance hold for six and seven of the 
groups, respectively. Income tax return preparers’ 
perceived risk was expected to be more homogenous in the 
SLL (single play, low probability, low consequence) group 
than the other groups because only one taxpayer is 
involved and because the SLL group is the one with the 
smallest penalty and lowest probability of the IRS’s 
assessing penalties. ANOVA is robust to violations of the 
equal variance assumption if the data is normally 
distributed. Seven of the eight groups have equal 
variances and six are normally distributed. Small sample 
sizes frequently have unequal variances and non-normal 
distributions, yet they are drawn from populations that 
are normally distributed and that have equal variances. 
Although the assumptions of ANOVA are not completely valid 
for this sample, ANOVA is robust to these particular
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violations. ANOVA will be used to test the hypotheses 
even though the results may be on the conservative side as 
previously stated.
Equal Risk Perceived for Single and Multi-Plav Decisions
The first hypothesis predicts that income tax 
return preparers will perceive more risk for reporting 
aggressively on ten clients’ income tax returns than for 
reporting aggressively on one client’s income tax return 
when the probability of the IRS’ assessing penalties and 
consequence to the preparer are the same. Perceived risk 
was measured on a Galton Bar scale anchored by zero, "Very 
Low Risk" and 100, "Very High Risk". Panel A, table 6 
exhibits the effects of decision type, probability of the 
IRS’ assessing penalties, and consequence on income tax 
return preparers’ perceived risk of reporting aggressively 
on clients’ income tax returns. The overall mean of 
perceived risk is 53.11. The difference in the estimated 
least squares means for each multi-play decision group and 
the corresponding single play decision group are -6.36 for 
the high probability, high consequence groups, 4.24 for 
the high probability, low consequence groups, 4.81 for the 
low probability, high consequence groups, and 14.40 
for the low probability, low consequence groups. The 
differences in the estimated means were in the predicted 
direction except for the high probability, high 
consequence groups. In a one-tail test, the independent
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T A B L E  7
Test of Effect of Decision Type, Probability, and 
Consequence on Income Tax Return Preparers’ Perceived Risk 
of Reporting Aggressively on Clients’ Income Tax Returns
Using ANOVA
Panel A Overall Test
Multi-Play and Single Play Data
Dependent Variable: Perceived Risk
Source DF Sum of Squares F Value Pr > FaModel 7 39649.3401 10.02 0.0001Error 162 91573.2559Corrected
Total 169 131222.5961
R-Square C.V. RISK Mean0.302153 44.76445 53.112
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr > Fa
DEC TYPE 1 767.9241 1.36 0.2455
PROB 1 2334.9432 4.13 0.0437
DEC TYPE*PROB 1 1193.2636 2.11 0.1482
CONS 1 36395.7195 64.39 0.0001
DEC TYPE*CONS 1 1069.7236 1.89 0.1708
PROB*CONS 1 57.4863 0.10 0.7502
DEC TYPE*PROB
*CONS 1 2.5909 0.00 0.9461
aTwo-tail test.
Panel B - High Probability Low Probability
Cell Least
Squares Consequence ConsequenceMeans High LOW High Low
Multi-Play 67.96 42.66 64.92 41.45
Single Play 74.32 38.42 60.11 27.05
variable decision type, with a p-value of 0.1228, is not 
significant. No difference exists in the perceived risk
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between reporting aggressively for a particular tax item 
on one client’s income tax return and reporting the same 
item aggressively on ten clients’ income tax returns when 
the probability of the IRS’ assessing a penalty and 
consequence are the same.
When are consequences for financial decisions 
the same? Is one (single play) decision concerning 
$500equivalent to ten $50 or ten $500 decisions (multi­
play), i.e., should the amounts of the ten decisions total 
the amount of the single play decision or should each of 
the ten decisions be for the same amount as the single 
play decision? In the gambling studies, a fraction of the 
single play amount was used so that the expected values of 
the single play gamble and the multi-play gambles were the 
same. In the test of the first hypothesis just presented, 
each multi-play amount was exactly the same as the single 
play amount. To be consistent with the prior studies, a 
control group was included in the study for which the 
consequence amount was one-tenth of the single play 
amount.
In the multi-play decision type, high 
consequence (penalty, etc.) was $5,000 and the low 
consequence was $150, whereas in the control group, the 
amounts are $500 and $15, respectively. Data from the 
control group is referred to as fraction of multi-play.
An ANOVA table is presented in table 8 in which the
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fraction of multi-play data is used instead of the multi­
play data. As expected, the mean perceived risk, 47.24, 
is lower than when the higher multi-play amounts were used 
in the analysis. Decision type is significant at the 
0.0126 level, probability at the 0.0669 level, and 
consequence at the 0.0001 level in a one-tail test when 
fraction of multi-play data is included in the analysis. 
The interactions remain insignificant.
Although there is a main effect for decision 
type when multi-play consequence is only one-tenth of the 
single play amount, the difference is not in the 
hypothesized direction for three of the four groups. Only 
in the low probability/low consequence group is the 
estimated mean of perceived risk for single play decisions 
(27.05) less than that for fraction-of-multi-play 
decisions (28.09). This difference in the results 
obtained when data from the control group was used instead 
of the multi-play data merits further investigation. 
Multiplicative Model Not Psed bv Tax Preparers
The second hypothesis tests for the use of a 
multiplicative information integration theory decision 
model when income tax return preparers make decisions 
about assuming an aggressive tax posture on several 
clients’ income tax returns. The hypothesis was tested 
using the fraction of multi-play observations since there 
was no difference in the decision model the income tax
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T A B L E  8
Test of Effect of Decision Type, Probability and 
Consequence on Income Tax Preparers Perceived Risk
for the Control Group
Panel A - Overall Test
General Linear Models Procedure
Dependent Variable: Perceived Risk
Source DF Sum of Squares F Value Pr > Fa
Model 7 37906.6153 11.78 0.0001
Error 135 62067.3518
Corrected Total 142 99973.9672
R-Square C.V. Perceived Risk Mean
0.379165 45.38786 47 . 241647
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr > Fb
DEC TYPE 1 2357.193 5.13 0.0126
PROB 1 1046.552 2.28 0.0669
DEC TYPE*PROB 1 1852.827 4.03 0.0234
CONS 1 27640.756 60.12 0.0001
DEC TYPE*CONS 1 1375.072 2.99 0.0430
PROB*CONS 1 291.242 0.63 0.2138
DEC_TYPE * PROB * CONS 1 646.626 1.41 0.1189
aTwo tail test. 
bOne tail test.
Panel B - Least Squares Means
Types
High Probability Low Probability
Consequence Consequence
High Low High Low
Fraction of
Multi-Play 48.18 33.48 57.20 28.09
Single Play 74.32 38.42 60.11 27.05
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preparers used to make single play and multi-play 
decisions when consequence was the same amount for each of 
the ten clients in the multi-play treatment as for one 
client in the single play treatment.
If income tax return preparers combine the 
probability of the IRS' assessing a penalty with 
consequences multiplicatively, the means of the groups 
will plot as diverging fan shaped curves. A two factor 
multiplicative model, for which interaction has more than 
a single degree of freedom, must have both of the main 
effects significant, the bilinear interaction component 
significant, and all residual interaction components
Fraction of Multi-Play Decisions







"5 50 > 1
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Low Probability High Probability 
Probability IRS' Assessing Penalties
Figure 4. Perceived Risk of Reporting 
Aggressively on Clients'Income Tax Returns for
Control Group
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nonsignificant. A multiplicative model of income tax 
preparers’ perceived risk requires significant main 
effects for consequence and probability of the IRS’ 
assessing a penalty, and a significant consequence by 
probability interaction.
The control group, fraction of multi-play, does 
not support HA 2 neither statistically nor graphically.
The main effect for consequence is significant at the 
0.0001 level. But the main effect for probability, 
p-value 0.7309, and the probability by consequence 
interaction, p-value 0.1750, are not significant. The 
means plot as converging curves. Figure 4 exhibits the 
graphs of the estimated cell means of the fraction of 
multi-play data. The high consequence curve has a 
negative slope while the low consequence curve has a 
positive slope. This suggests the use of an information 
integration theory combination model rather than the 
multiplicative model predicted in the second hypothesis. 
Additive Model Utilized in Single Play Decisions
The third research hypothesis postulates that 
income tax return preparers utilize an additive 
information integration theory model to make a unique, one 
time decision that affects only one client. An additive 
model can be detected both graphically and through 
statistical tests. Graphically, an additive model plots 
as parallel curves. Statistically, an additive model has
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T A B L E  9
Test of Use of Additive Information 
Integration Theory Model
General Linear Models Procedure 


















Perceived Risk Mean 
51.76744
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr > F
PROB 1 3257.5950 6.70 0.0115
CONS 1 23694.4080 48.73 0.0001
PROB*CONS 1 40.0810 0.08 0.7748
significant main effects for the independent variables but 
no significant interaction. When both independent 
variables are significant, the parallel curves must be 
either increasing or decreasing. In an additive model, 
the parallel curves are generally increasing as shown in 
panel B, figure 3. If the independent variable plotted on 
the horizontal axis is not significant, the curves will be 
parallel to the horizontal axis as shown in panel C, 
figure 3.
The ANOVA results presented in table 9 show that 
the probability of the IRS’ assessing a penalty, PROB, is 
significant at the 0.0115 level and that consequence,
CONS, is highly significant at the 0.0001 level (two tail
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Multi-Play Decisions
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Figure 5. Income Tax Preparers1 Perceived Risk of 
Reporting Aggressively on One Client's Income Tax
Return
tests). The p-value (0.7748) for the PROB*CONS 
interaction is not significant. Therefore, the 
statistical requirements for an additive model are met.
Graphically the estimated cell means of the 
single play groups plot as monotonically increasing 
parallel curves. The plot of the estimated cell means of 
the single play decision type groups shown in figure 5 
clearly depicts an additive model. These conditions 
provide support for the third research hypothesis: income
tax return preparers combine information on probabilities 
and damages consistent with an additive model when making 
unique decisions.
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T A B L E  1 0
Test of Use of Multiplicative Information 
Integration Theory Model
General Linear Models Procedure 
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In as much as no difference was detected between 
the single play and multi-play decision types when the 
multi-play consequence was equal to the single play 
consequence amount, the multi-play data was examined to 
ascertain whether an additive model was used (see 
table 9). Using multi-play data, there is a significant 
main effect for consequence (CONS), which has a p-value of 
0.0001 (two tail test). However, there is no main effect 
for probability, p-value 0.6924. The PROB*CONS 
interaction is not significant (p-value 0.8638).
Therefore, statistically, the multi-play data satisfies 
the requirements for a special case of the additive model 
when probability is not significant. Disregarding
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probability implies that a constant probability value of 
zero is added to the value of consequence when income tax 
return preparers make decisions that affect ten clients. 
This disregard of probability culminates in the estimated 
cell means plotting as curves parallel to the x-axis. The 
curves are plotted in figure 6. In figure 6, the data 
plots as two parallel curves similar to the graph in 
panel C, figure 3. No difference in multi-play and single 
play decision types was detected because an additive model 
was used to make both types of decisions, albeit, a 
special case of the additive model was used for multi-play 
decisions when consequence was the same amount for each of
Multi-Play Decisions















Low Probability High Probability
Probability IRS' Assessing Penalties
Figure 6. Perceived Risk of Reporting 
Aggressively on Ten Clients' Income 
Tax Returns
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the ten clients as for the one client in the single play 
condition.
Perceived Risk Congruous With Recommendations
Perceived risk should be related to the 
recommendations that income tax return preparers make to 
their clients if it actually represents a combination of 
their potential losses and the probability that those 
losses will occur. The subjects were asked about the 
position on this tax issue that they would suggest to 
their clients. The question was stated as "Do you 
recommend taking the deduction on this (these) client’s 
(clients’) income tax return(s)?" Their Yes/No answer to 
the question was the dependent variable in a logistic 
regression test of all three hypotheses. The results of 
the statistical analysis are presented in table 11. 
Basically, these results are the same as those from the 
ANOVA test. The main effects for probability and 
consequence were significant (p-values 0.0416 and less 
than 0.0001 respectively (see table 11)). The only 
interaction pertinent to this study, probability by 
consequence, with a p-value of 0.9736 was not significant.
Results of the logistic test, using the income 
tax return preparers’ recommendations as the dependent 
variable, augments those from ANOVA using perceived risk 
as the dependent variable.
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T A B L E  1 1
Test of Income Tax Preparers' Perceived Risk for 
Making Aggressive Recommendations to Clients
CATMOD PROCEDURE
Response: RECOM 
Weight Variable: None 
Data Set: LOGRISK 
Frequency Missing: 6
Response Levels (R)= 
Populations (S)= 







Source DF Chi-Square Prob
INTERCEPT 1 210.07 0.0000DEC TYPE 1 0.26 0.6108PROB 1 4.15 0.0416DEC TYPE*PROB 1 1.99 0.1586CONS 1 46.42 0.0000
DEC TYPE*CONS 1 8.77 0.0031PROB*CONS 1 0.00 0.9736
DEC TYPE*PROB*CONS 1 1.09 0.2970
RESIDUAL 0 • •




INTERCEPT 1 0.4637 0.0320 210.07 0.0000DEC TYPE 2 0.0163 0.0320 0.26 0.6108PROB 3 0.0652 0.0320 4.15 0.0416DEC TYPE*PROB 4 -0.0451 0.0320 1.99 0.1586CONS 5 0.2180 0.0320 46.42 0.0000DEC TYPE*CONS 6 -0.0947 0.0320 8.77 0.0031PROB*CONS 7 0.0011 0.0320 0.00 0.9736
DEC TYPE*PROB
*CONS 8 -0.0334 0.0320 1.09 0.2970
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Summary
The first hypothesis was supported when the 
potential losses to the preparer were one-tenth of the 
single play amount but not when the amounts were the same. 
However the results were not in the predicted direction. 
There was no main effect for type of decision when the 
multi-play amount was the same as for single play. Income 
tax return preparers appear to combine the probability of 
the IRS’ assessing penalties and damages in the same 
manner when assessing risk for a decision that applies to 
one client as when assessing risk for a decision that 
applies to several clients when the future losses related 
to each client are the same. Therefore, HA  ̂was supported 
by data from the control group but not by the multi-play 
data.
There was no probability by consequence 
interaction for perceived risk. Nor was there a main 
effect for probability when only the multi-play data was 
analyzed, therefore the second hypothesis was not 
supported. Income tax return preparers do not appear to 
combine information according to an information 
integration theory multiplicative model when making 
decisions for several clients. Instead, the model that 
income tax return preparers use appears to depend upon the 
amount of their potential losses. A special case of the 
additive model in which they ignored probability was used
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for the multi-play decisions when consequence was the same 
as for single play. When the consequence was one-tenth of 
the single play amount, the preparers appeared to use a 
combination model to make decisions.
There is overwhelming statistical support for an 
additive model when making decisions applicable to only 
one client. There were main effects for probability and 
consequence but no interaction between the two. HA 3 was 
also supported by the graphs of the estimated cell means, 
which plotted as monotonically increasing parallel curves.
The results presented in this chapter will be 
reviewed in the next chapter. Then the contributions and 
limitations of the study will be addressed along with 
possibilities for future research.
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction.
Despite the tremendous amount of the tax gap, 
taxpayers pay more income taxes that most consider 
economically rational (Aim, McClelland and Schulze 1992). 
This study may help explain this overpayment by some 
taxpayers and underpayment by others by examining the 
perceived risk that tax preparers associate with reporting 
aggressively on their clients' tax returns. Approximately 
50% of all income tax returns are prepared by paid 
preparers (Internal Revenue Service 1994). The risk these 
preparers perceive in reporting aggressively may influence 
the taxpayers' (their clients') compliance decisions.
This study investigated the effect that the probability of 
the IRS' examining a client's tax return and the 
consequence (damages) the preparer may suffer has on 
preparers' perceived risk of reporting aggressively on 
their clients' income tax returns as well as the cognitive 
algebra that tax preparers use to formulate risk 
perceptions.
This chapter is organized in four subsections. 
The first subsection summarizes and interprets the results
84
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of the study. In the second subsection, the research 
contributions of the study are addressed. Limitations of 
the study are enumerated in the third subsection. The 
fourth and last subsection presents future research 
opportunities.
Summary and Discussion, of Results
Most of the 244 subjects were sole practitioners 
or partners in small CPA firms. Their assumption of the 
risks of self-employment sets them apart from the general 
population. The mean scores on the JPI-R were 56 and 75.6 
for risk and traditional values, respectively. These mean 
scores show that the income tax return preparers in this 
study follow the rules and adhere to traditional values 
but are risk seeking in financial matters. A high score 
for risk means that the subjects "are prone to exposing 
themselves to situations having uncertain outcomes" 
(Jackson 1994, 23). The subjects' constant exposure to 
uncertain outcomes may moderate the risk they perceive for 
decisions they make on a daily basis, e.g., whether to 
assume an aggressive posture on a particular tax issue.
Although many researchers have found that a 
person's ethical and financial risk propensities affect 
their income tax reporting decisions, the subjects in this 
study may not have been influenced by their personal risk 
propensities because they were not making decisions solely 
for themselves. Instead, they were making decisions for
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their clients. Several subjects commented that they took 
more risk on their personal income tax returns than on 
their clients' income tax returns. Therefore, their 
personal risk propensities may be moderated when they 
function as professional income tax advisers.
The lack of support for the first hypothesis 
using the same amount for each multi-play decision as for 
a single play decision may be attributed to the magnitude 
of the manipulation being insufficient to produce a 
significant difference in decision type. If, in their 
role of client advocate, income tax return preparers 
consistently take aggressive positions on most of their 
clients' income tax returns, they may feel that the 
decision to take an aggressive position on only ten tax 
returns does not materially increase the possibility of a 
large future loss. The empirical data fails to reject the 
first null hypothesis which was income tax return 
preparers will perceive the same risk for reporting 
aggressively on one (single play decision) client's income 
tax return as for reporting aggressively on ten clients' 
(multi-play decision) income tax returns when the 
preparers' potential losses are identical.
There was a significant difference in the risk 
perceived by the control group and that perceived by the 
single play group. But, the difference was not in the 
expected direction for three of the four manipulations.
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The control groups (fraction-of-multi-play groups) are 
merely two lower levels of multi-play consequence. 
According to the premises of information integration 
theory the same decision model should be used for the 
fraction-of-multi-play decisions as for the multi-play 
decisions. Instead, income tax return preparers used a 
decision model for fraction-of-multi-play amounts that is 
different from the additive model used in single play 
decisions and from the special case of the additive model 
used in multi-play decisions when consequence was the same 
amount as in the single play condition. This finding 
casts doubt on the findings of other studies that have 
used a reduced value of each gamble. Findings in those 
studies may be due to an inherent difference in the 
gambles rather than to a difference in the decision models 
utilized by the decision makers.
The second and third hypotheses which predict 
that a multiplicative model is used for repeated decisions 
and an additive model for unique decisions were tested 
after finding that the control groups differed 
significantly from the single play groups. There was no 
significant difference in income tax preparers' perceived 
risk for single play and multi-play decisions when 
consequence was the same dollar amount. The preparers 
used an additive model to formulate their perceived risk 
of reporting aggressively on their clients' income tax
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returns when consequence was the same amount regardless of 
the number of clients affected by the decision. When 
multi-play consequence was one-tenth of the single play 
amount, the preparers used a combination model to 
formulate their perceived risk. Consequence is highly 
significant in the determination of perceived risk. 
Probability is ignored in multi-play decisions when 
consequence is the same as for the single play groups.
This is consistent with the finding of Diamond (1988) in 
that probability is ignored when consequences are high.
It also agrees with findings of Payne and Braunstein 
(1971) that the most influential factor in situations 
where the probability of winning is greater than the 
probability of losing is the value of the outcome 
tconsequence).
To summarize: the results failed to support the
first research hypothesis—income tax return preparers 
perceive less risk for a single play decision than for a 
multi-play decision when the consequence to the preparer 
are the same; or the second hypothesis—income tax return 
preparers will use a multiplicative model to make multi- 
play decisions. The third hypothesis was supported—income 
tax return preparers will use an additive model to make 
single play decisions.
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Research. Contributions
The results of this study will be useful to 
researchers as well as to taxing authorities. Researchers 
will benefit from knowing that income tax return preparers 
used the same model for forming risk perceptions for one 
client as for several clients when the consequence to the 
preparer were the same for each client. Also, the study 
shows that tax preparers did not use the same model when 
consequence was small (one-tenth) as when it was large. 
This suggests that the findings of studies re decisions 
making under uncertainty that employed a fraction of a 
gamble to be played multiple times as the long-run (multi- 
play) manipulation of the decision type construct may not 
be valid because of intrinsic differences in the way 
people make decisions for small and large consequences.
In nonacademic settings, knowing that income tax 
preparers' perceived risk is approximately the same for 
reporting aggressively on one client's return as for 
reporting aggressively on several returns may help taxing 
authorities in selecting returns to examine and in 
selecting variables to manipulate to increase compliance. 
The study supports the IRS's decision to attempt achieving 
greater compliance without increasing the number of tax 
returns examined. While preparers appeared to be adding 
probability of penalties being assessed to consequences, 
perceived risk increases very slowly. Therefore,
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doubling the number of returns examined will probably 
increase preparers' perceived risk (or reduce their 
aggressive reporting postures) only a minuscule amount.
The IRS should consider revising preparer penalties from 
the current fixed amounts of $250 and $1,000 to a 
percentage of additional taxes assessed to the preparers' 
clients, since consequence has a significant effect on 
preparers' perceived risk. Also, the IRS should select 
returns for examination without regard to the preparer's 
age, gender, or size of firm since these characteristics 
do not appear to influence the aggressiveness of their 
recommendations to clients.
This study also helps explain why actual tax 
filings are so conservative and deviate from expected 
utility theory predictions while the "tax gap" continues. 
The finding that preparers are financial risk takers helps 
explain their exploiter role. On the other hand, their 
high score on traditional values may lead them, in their 
enforcer role, to insure that their clients pay close to 
their "fair share" of income taxes.
Limitations
The subjects for this study are employees of CPA 
or law firms; therefore, the results of the study cannot 
be generalized to all income tax return preparers. Since 
the test scenario involves only one deduction—medical 
expenses for periods extending beyond one year—the results
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may not be generalizable to other situations. It is not 
possible to include all the pertinent information tax 
professionals may have in real practice in a laboratory 
test environment; thus, tax professionals may make 
different decisions in practice. The results may be 
biased if the nonmonetary consequences of the IRS' 
assessing penalties are not constant across conditions. 
This study deals with only two types of risk—financial and 
ethical. Income tax return preparers may face other types 
of risk (e.g., social, psychological, physical, and time) 
which may influence their decisions and bias the results 
of this study.
Research Opportunities
There are many opportunities for further tax 
related research in this area. Future research may 
address the factors that dominate particular tax 
decisions. Nonmultiplicative models may be investigated 
further to identify the precise model (adding, 
subtracting, dividing, or a combination of these 
arithmetic operations) income tax return preparers use to 
make certain tax decisions. The author is researching the 
compromise point between maximizing expected value and 
achieving an individually determined level of acceptable 
risk.
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APPENDIX A
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS BY GROUP
Group Number of Subjects
Total ANOVA ANCOVA
Multi-Play Decision Group
High Probability/High Consequence 23 21 17
High Probability/Low Consequence 23 22 15
Low Probability/High Consequence 26 24 22
Low probability/Low Consequence 23 22 20
95 89 74
Single Play Decision Group
High Probability/High Consequence 21 21 20
High Probability/Low Consequence 20 19 17
Low Probability/High Consequence 28 24 19
Low probability/Low Consequence 18 17 14
87 81 70
Control Group (Fraction of Multi-Play 
Decision Group)
High Probability/High Consequence 16 15 15
High Probability/Low Consequence 17 15 15
Low Probability/High Consequence 14 12 12
Low probability/Low Consequence 15 12 12
62 54 54
Total Number Subjects in Sample 244 224 198
99
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EXCERPTS FROM THE EXPERIMENTAL TASK
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7112 N 7th Street Apt B 
McAllen, Texas 78504 
December, 1995
Dear Professional Income Tax Preparer:
Please participate in this study. As a 
practicing income tax professional, you are sometimes 
required to interpret and apply the law when there is 
ambiguous or conflicting authority. The purpose of this 
study is to learn more about how professionals such as you 
make decisions in situations with ambiguous tax 
consequences. While you may consider numerous factors 
when making these decisions, I am specifically interested 
in how professionals form risk perceptions and how those 
perceptions affect their decisions.
To examine this issue, you will be asked to make 
a reporting recommendation to a hypothetical client 
concerning an item with ambiguous tax consequences. In 
addition to recommending a tax position, you will also be 
asked to assess the risk the reporting situation adds to 
the engagement. This is not a test; there are no "right" 
answers to the case you will review. I am interested in 
your opinions and assessment of the case. Your responses 
are anonymous and will only be used in presenting 
aggregate results.
After reviewing the case, you will be asked some 
additional questions. Again, these are intended to give 
me an idea of who is participating in the study and 
responses will be kept strictly confidential. Please 
answer all of the questions as well as you can.
Thanks again for your time. The specific 
instructions begin on the next page. The study should 
take no more than 15 minutes to complete. Please allow 
enough time to complete it without interruption. Section 
I should be returned to me in the enclosed envelope. 
Section II is provided for your convenience. This study 
is part of my Ph.D. dissertation at Louisiana State 
University. I appreciate your help.
Sincerely,
V. Carlene Eddlemon
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INTRODUCTION
This research study investigates how income tax return 
preparers form risk perceptions when making tax related 
decisions. While there is general consensus about the nature 
of perceived risk, there is no universally accepted definition 
of perceived risk. Webster's Dictionary defines risk as "the 
possibility of loss, disadvantage or damage; it is the 
subjective estimation of loss as measured by the decision 
maker."
Your task is (1) to record the amount of risk that you 
perceive in the following tax situation, and (2) to indicate 
the tax position you recommend.
Assume that the taxpayers have reported honestly and 
accurately on all previously filed tax returns and that they 
want items in gray areas reported on their tax returns in the 
manner that is most favorable to them. Assume further, that 
they understand that if certain positions are taken on items in 
gray areas that they (the taxpayers) may have to pay additional 
taxes and interest if the IRS audits those items.
Read the tax case carefully. At the bottom of the case 
there is a hundred point continuous scale. The two end points 
of the scale have been marked as 0, Very Low Risk, and 100,
Very High Risk. Record the risk you perceive for yourself and 
your firm for the case by placing a slash (/) on the scale line 
below it.
Very Low Very High
Risk Risk
i . ! . . . .  !
0 100
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PART I
At least 10 of your clients, all in their early 50's, have 
been offered early retirement packages. None of their 
employers provide medical benefits to retired employees.
However each employer has a voluntary employees benefit 
association, as defined by IRC §501 (c) (9) . Retired employees 
may participate in an association's health care program by 
paying a lump-sum amount (approximately $54,000 which will 
average $250 - $30 0 per month until each retiree and his/her 
spouse are 65 years old and eligible for Medicare) .
The plans cover all medical expenses—drugs, dental, vision 
care, contact lens, etc.—for both the retired employee and 
his/her spouse until they are 65 years old and eligible for 
Medicare. These clients' retirement packages include 
sufficient cash to prepay the medical expenses. Each of these 
clients has already incurred medical expenses for this tax year 
that will not be reimbursed by medical insurance exceeding 7M% 
of their AGI. If your clients pay the entire amount now and 
claim it as a medical deduction on their income tax returns, 
each of their income taxes will be reduced by approximately 
$16,700.
Each of these clients files a joint tax return with 
his/her spouse. Except for the early retirement offer, their 
returns for this year are very similar to each other and to 
their prior years' returns. Items on a typical return are:
♦Includes early retirement payment.
They have the usual itemized deductions for home interest 
($2,500), real estate taxes ($3,000), and contributions 
($3,000) for both years and, for this year, medical expenses 
exceeding 7M% of AGI plus the $54,000.
You must decide whether to deduct the $54,000 payment for 
medical care (IRC §213). Their employers cannot provide 
income tax guidance to them because this is an area the IRS is 
studying and for which the IRS will not issue private letter
Last Year This Year
Salary
Interest and Dividends 
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rulings (Rev. Proc. 95-3). However, the IRS District Director 
for your area was recently quoted as saying, "We (the IRS in 
your district) will actively pursue overly aggressive 
deductions for medical care extending beyond one year even 
though the National Office is not making advance rulings on 
this issue."
You must make a recommendation to your clients but the 
authoritities relating to such payments are ambiguous. The 
relevant authorities are summarized on pages 5 and 6. If the 
medical deduction is disallowed, each client will be assessed 
the excess tax, interest on the excess tax, and penalties 
totalling $5,000. If you recommend a tax position to a client, 
your firm pays the penalty for the client in the event the IRS 
disallows the deduction. Please indicate the amount of risk 
you perceive for yourself and your firm in taking this 
deduction on all these clients' tax returns.
Very Low Very High
Risk Risk
! . . . . ! . .  !
0 100
Do you recommend taking the deduction on all these clients' tax 
returns?
Yes No
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Please provide the following demographic information. 
1- Age: _____
2. Gender: Female Male
3. Primary area o f  accounting: T ax  A udit  Other_____
4. Years experience in tax preparation: _____
5. Highest level o f  education: Less than Baccalaureate Degree (please specify)
Baccalaureate Degree in Accounting  other (please specify)_______
Master’s D egree  in Accounting  Taxation  Other___
Law Degree P hD  Other Advanced Degrees (specify)______
6. Number professional personnel, including partners, in your accounting firm _____
7. Household Income: ____________________




0 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. What factor(s) did you consider in assessing risk?___________________________
10. Is the amount o f  risk you perceive for yourself different from that you perceive for 
your firm?
(Explain)___________________________________________________________________________
11. Mark the scale below to answer: "Do you think the scenario is clear cut?”
Very Clear Cut




I........ . ! ....,....I....,....!....,... . ! . . . . , , .... !
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
12. Describe any situations that you have encounter in practice concerning prepaid medical 
expenses.__________________________________________________________________________
13. How many o f  your clients have had similar tax problems?____________________
14. Without looking back at the case, how many clients were you making a decision for in 
this study? _______________
•H/itniA'i Jfu rom /iM ituf //(■!
6 r M f p m o n
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SUMMARY OF AUTHORITIES CONCERNING AMBIGUOUS MEDICAL
PAYMENTS
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec. 213(a) which covers 
the deductibility of medical, dental, etc., expenses 
states:
There shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses 
paid during the taxable year, not compensated for 
by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the 
taxpayer, his spouse, or dependent (as defined in 
section 152), to the extent that such expenses 
exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.
The related Income Tax Regulations (Regs) §1.213-1 state:
(a) Allowance of deduction: (1) Section 213
permits a deduction of payments for certain 
medical expenses (including expenses for medicine 
and drugs). Except as provided in paragraph (d) 
of this section (relating to special rule for 
decedents) a deduction is allowable only to 
individuals and only with respect to medical 
expenses actually paid during the taxable year, 
regardless of when the incident or event which 
occasioned the expenses occurred and regardless of 
the method of accounting employed by the taxpayer 
in making his income tax return. Thus, if the 
medical expenses are incurred but not paid during 
the taxable year, no deduction for such expenses 
shall be allowed for such year.
Neither the IRC nor the Regs require that medical payments 
apply to services already rendered or obligations 
previously incurred. Both require only that payment be 
made in the year the deduction is taken. However, the IRS 
relies on the 1956 Bassett case (26 TC 619) to disallow 
deductions for prepaid medical expenses except as noted 
below. The Bassetts' medical expenses were less than the 
annual percentage-of-adjusted gross-income (3% in 1950) in 
both 1950 (the year of prepayment) and 1951 (the year the
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expenses were incurred). The Tax Court considered the
intent of the law in deciding the Bassett case saying that
to allow their prepaid medical expenses
would violate the purpose of its enactment and 
yield a result contrary to the Congressional 
intent. In computing the medical expenses for a 
taxable year, to include a prepaid item for 
medical services not rendered in the year of 
payment might qualify a taxpayer for a medical 
deduction, whereas if an advance payment for 
medical care is not given recognition the total 
medical expense may not be in excess of the 5 [3] 
per cent limitation in the taxable year or ensuing 
years.
Congress has amended the IRC numerous times since 1956, 
yet the requirement that medical payments apply only to 
the current year or preceding years has not been added to 
§213 .
One exception applies to the prepayment of medical
care to be provided after the taxpayer becomes 65 years
old (IRC § 213(d)(7)).
Subject to the limitations of paragraph (6), 
premiums paid during the taxable year by a
taxpayer before he attains the age of 65 for
insurance covering medical care (within the 
meaning of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph 
(1)) for the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent
after the taxpayer attains the age of 65 shall be
treated as expenses paid during the taxable year 
for insurance which constitutes medical care if 
premiums for such insurance are payable (on a 
level payment basis) under the contract for a 
period of 10 years or more or until the year in 
which the taxpayer attains the age of 65 (but in 
no case for a period of less than 5 years).
Another exception applies to the portion of the 
entrance fee to a life-care facility allocable to the
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taxpayer's medical care, where the obligation to pay the 
facility is incurred when payment is madet even though 
medical services will only be rendered in the future, if 
at all (Rev Rul 75-302, 1975 CB 86). This exception has 
no age requirement and is a lump sum payment.
Regulation §1.213(e) (1) (iii) allows a taxpayer to 
deduct the difference in the excess of the cost of capital 
improvements and the increase in the value of the property 
as a medical expense if it has as its primary purpose the 
medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or his 
dependent. The Regs use the example of an elevator that 
costs $1,000 and increases the value of the property $700. 
The $300 difference is not deducted ratably over the life 
of the improvement but deducted in full in the year 
acquired as a medical expense.
Thus, the IRS is inconsistent in allowing prepaid 
medical amounts. In this case, the taxpayers (your 
clients) must make a lump-sum payment to participate in a 
voluntary employees benefit association as defined by IRC 
§ 501(c)(9) which will provide medical care until the 
taxpayer and his/her spouse are eligible for Medicare.
Does this prepayment fall under the general rule of being 
deductible when paid, the Bassett case which disallows 
prepaid medical expenses, or the life-care exception where
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the obligation to pay is incurred when payment is made and 
which is currently deductible?
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